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 ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis uses data drawn from the ISTAT survey “Condizione e Integrazione sociale dei 
cittadini stranieri” (2016), carried out in 2011 and addressed to foreign citizens resident in Italy. 
This work has a double objective: to assess whether and which is the effect that perceived 
discrimination has on migrants’ health and how health, in turn, affects their employment status. 
In both cases a first attempt to implement instrumental variable strategy is made, so to tackle 
reverse causality and omitted variable bias. The obtained estimates indicate that perceived 
discrimination negatively affects health status, both mental and physical, and that it has a 
negative impact on migrants’ employment status, which is positively correlated with health. 
Furthermore, a third model concerning the relationship between perceived discrimination and 
socio-cultural integration is estimated, always adopting an IV approach. The estimates so 
obtained do not allow a clear interpretation, but there seems to be a positive correlation between 
discrimination and migrants’ behaviours signalling a higher level of social integration. 
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1. Introduction 
 
International migration is a global phenomenon and for some European Countries it can be said 
to be also a recent one. Italy, together with Spain and Ireland, is part of the so-called new 
migration Countries, where migration inflows have been consistently growing in the last 
decades (T.K. Bauer et al., 2000). According to the Eurostat data the share of immigrants over 
native population was as low as 1.7% in 1998, while the same data for 2017 reports that 8.3% 
of the population resident in Italy is non-nationals. Italy experienced the first net migration 
inflow in 1972, after the Northern Countries stopped to encourage immigration following on 
from social tensions and the fear of recession after the first oil shock. This inflow was mainly 
due to return migration, but already in the early 1990s the type of migration had changed and 
most immigrants were non-nationals and, particularly, came from non-EU Countries.  
This demographic change affecting some European Countries has important effects on 
native populations, which perceive both the economic and the socio-cultural consequences of 
immigration. Feelings and worries of the natives are reflected in the European political arena, 
where, in these last years, immigration policy has been a central topic in the electoral 
campaigns. In response to the recent increased migrants’ flows, many parties with protectionist 
views on immigration were born in the European Union. Among them there are the Front 
National in France, the Dutch Freedom Party, the United Kingdom Independence Party and the 
Lega Nord (Northern League) in Italy. Marine Le Pen, leader of the Front National, which 
obtained the 21% of the votes in the French Presidential Election in 2017 and lost at the second 
ballot, had proposed in February 2014 a referendum for stricter immigration regulation (G. 
Barone et al., 2014). 
Immigration policy involves establishing rules to determine quotas, admission 
mechanisms, procedures for citizenship acquisition and rules to regulate the inflows of asylum 
seekers. There exists a summary indicator, developed by the Fondazione Rodolfo Debendetti, 
measuring the degree of strictness of migration policy in a Country. This index takes into 
consideration seven different dimensions of migration legislation, which are likely to affect 
economic-driven migration from outside the European Union. Four of these seven aspects are: 
the number of entry requirements, the number of years of stay necessary to obtain a permanent 
residence permit, the existence of selection migration policies for high-skilled immigrants and, 
finally, the existence of quotas or point-based systems. This last aspect refers to different 
policies that can be implemented in order to put a cap to the number of migrants who are 
accepted by a Country every year. The system of quotas is simply based on the “first-come 
first-served” principle, while point-based mechanisms, which are adopted by a limited number 
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of Countries, award points on the basis of education, experience and language abilities. To 
construct the strictness migration policy index, the scores of each of the above categories are 
made comparable through a conversion in cardinal numbers, ranging from 1 to 6. The scores so 
obtained are then averaged out to obtain the final index, which can measure from a minimum 
of 1 to a maximum of 6, for stricter policies. Table 1 reports the 2010 index for eleven European 
Union Countries. 
Table 1- Strictness of migration policies in major EU immigration destinations (2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Country 
Quota/PSB 
system 
N° entry 
requiremen
ts 
First 
entrance 
N° staying 
requireme
nts 
N° 
adminin. 
bodies 
involved 
Years to 
obtain 
permanent 
residence 
Selective 
policies for 
high-
skilled 
Overall 
index 
2010 
Austria quota 6 before 4 1 or 2 5 no 4.3 
Finland no 3 before 2 1 or 2 4 limited 2.6 
France no 2 after 2 1 or 2 5 yes 0.7 
Germany no 2 after 4 1 5 yes 1.0 
Greece quota 2 after 5 1 10 limited 3.5 
Ireland quota 4 after 4 2 10 limited 3.8 
Italy quota 3 after 3 1 6 limited 2.5 
NL no 4 before 2 2 5 no 3.0 
Portugal quota 5 after 5 1 or 2 5 yes 3.7 
Spain quota 6 after 7 2 5 limited 3.9 
UK PBS+quota 4 before 3 1 5 limited 3.2 
Source: IZA 2011, The Integration of Migrants and its Effects in the Labour Market 
Notes:  
(2) Number of certificates and procedures to be admitted as a foreigner 
(3) Residence permit asked before or after entering the country for the first time 
(4) Number of certificates and procedures to legally reside in the territory 
(5) Number of administrative bodies involved to obtain a residence and a work permit 
(7) Number of categories positively selected (existence of fast-track, simplified procedures or exclusions from 
quotas). 
 
Italy 2010 index measured 2.5, which is one of the lowest values after France and Germany, 
indicating loose migration policies. What is also relevant to consider is the evolution of the 
strictness index over time. Figure 1 shows that Italy, as well as many other Countries, is above 
the 45 degree line, indicating tightened migration restrictions in 2010 with respect to 1990.  
The first systematic Italian Immigration Act is known as the Turco-Napolitano Act, after 
the then Social Affairs and Interior Ministers, and was passed in 1998. It was based on four 
pillars: preventing and combating illegal entry; regulating new flows of foreign workers; 
promoting the integration of immigrants holding a valid residence permit; and granting basic 
individual rights to illegal immigrants.  This Law was partially reformed in 2002 by the right-
wing government. Law No.189/2002, known as the Bossi-Fini Act, which made migration 
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policy rules more restrictive (T. Caponio, 2005). For instance, it made it compulsory to have an 
employment contract before arriving in Italy, as a necessary condition to obtain a residence 
permit. Moreover, the number of years of stay in Italy necessary to require a permanent 
residence permit was increased to six, but it was reduced to five again in 2003, as a result of a 
European Directive on the status of non-EU nationals who are long-term residents (Directive 
2003/109/EC). 
 The strictness of migration policies may represent the first obstacle to the integration of 
non-EU immigrants within society. Indeed, long and complex procedures to enter a foreign 
Country or to obtain residence permits hinder the access to the labour market and to the 
educational system. These obstacles, together with different cultural backgrounds, make it 
difficult for immigrants to integrate within society.  
 
Figure 1-Evolution of the index of strictness of migration policies in the largest immigration Countries in the EU 
 
Source: IZA 2011, The Integration of Migrants and its Effects in the Labour Market 
 
 
The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) is a tool which measures policies that promote 
migrants’ integration in 38 different Countries: European Union Member States and Australia, 
Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the US. 
The MIPEX is produced thanks to the project “Integration policies: Who benefits? The 
development and use of indicators in integration debates”, which is led by the Barcelona Centre 
for International Affairs (CIDOB), the Migration Policy Group (MPG), and over 35 national 
partners with co-funding from the European Commission. 
In order to compute MIPEX, eight different areas of policy intervention are identified: labour 
market mobility, education, political participation, access to nationality, family reunion, health, 
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permanent residence and anti-discrimination. MIPEX is based on 167 policy indicators, 
consisting of 167 questions related to the eight policy areas, which were designed to benchmark 
current laws and policies against the highest standards. Each question has three possible 
answers which can be awarded from one to three points for those policies meeting the highest 
standards. Questions belonging to a same area are grouped into four sub-areas, concerning 
similar aspects of the policy, whose score is computed as the average of the questions scores. 
Thereafter, the points are averaged out at a policy area level and then the average of the points 
of the eight areas is obtained. Finally, the initial 1, 2, 3 ranking is converted into a 0, 50, 100 
scale: the closer a Country score is to 100 the closer the implemented policy is to the top 
standards. Table 2 shows both the overall and the specific scores for Italy in comparison with 
the EU-15 average.  
Table 2-MIPEX 2014 in Italy and in the EU-15 
  Italy EU-15 
Overall Score 58 61 
Family Reunion 72 61 
Labour Market Mobility 66 68 
Permanent Residence 65 64 
Health 65 52 
Anti-discrimination 61 68 
Political Participation 58 60 
Access to nationality 50 59 
Education 34 49 
Source: mipex.eu 
 
The reported MIPEX refers to 2014. Italy overall score is 58, slightly under the EU-15 average. 
Italy score is higher than the EU-15 in the family reunion and health areas. As to the latter, Italy 
is one of the fourteen MIPEX Countries that provides language support in the healthcare 
system. Moreover, in Italy all residents have the same healthcare coverage as nationals in law 
and in practice. On the other hand, the policy areas in which Italy is definitely below the EU-
15 level are anti-discrimination, education and access to nationality. An education MIPEX 
lower than 50 signals that Italian schools are not helping pupils integrate, which may be due to 
the fact that teachers cannot recognise immigrants’ needs and treat them as any other students, 
without any additional support. As far as access to nationality is concerned, except for marginal 
cases, in Italy non-EU immigrants can get Italian citizenship after ten years of residence. This 
data is far above the most frequent residence requirement in the MIPEX Countries, which is 
five years, and the average, which is seven years. As to anti-discrimination, a poor score may 
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indicate that potential victims are too poorly informed and supported to take even the first step 
in the long path to justice or that institutions have weak enforcement mechanisms. 
This thesis focuses precisely on what may be the effects of discrimination on 
immigrants’ life in Italy. What is original about this work is the fact that Italian data, provided 
by the ISTAT survey “Condizione e Integrazione Sociale dei Cittadini Stranieri” (2016), is used 
and that this data focuses on immigrants’ own perceptions. This represents something new with 
respect to previous works, most of which are focused on explaining natives’ attitudes towards 
immigrants and consider either the social or the economic effects of migration. The present 
analysis investigates both social and economic effects of discrimination against immigrants. 
This thesis has a double objective and is thus organised in two interlinked parts. In the 
first part the objective is to isolate the impact that insults and threats against migrants have on 
their perception of discrimination to observe what is the effect that these exogenous variations 
in discrimination perception have on immigrants’ health. On the other hand, the second part 
aims at capturing the effect that immigrants’ health has on their employment status, always 
isolating changes in health status determined by offences and aggressions. Using more technical 
terms, each one of the two models just described is estimated through an instrumental variable 
strategy, in which the instruments used are always verbal insults and threats, assaults. A third 
model is also presented, which estimates the association between discrimination and social 
integration, always adopting an instrumental variable strategy. 
The thesis continues with a section that presents the existing literature dealing with the topic 
of migration. Following are sections that describe the data used and detail the empirical 
methodology. These are then followed by the main results, which are divided into four parts. 
The first one analyses which are the determinants of migrants’ life satisfaction, the second one 
presents the association between discrimination and health, the third one illustrates the impact 
that immigrants’ health has on their employment status and the final section presents the results 
concerning the association between discrimination and integration. These three last sections 
report estimates using both weighted least-squares and Generalised Method of Moments. 
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2. Literature review 
 
Literature dealing with the economic impact of migration usually focuses on identifying what 
are the determinants of the public opinions on immigrants. Scholars find three main channels 
which affect natives’ perception of migrants: their impact on the labour market, on the fiscal 
system and, thirdly, on the cultural and social sphere. 
 First of all, as to migration effects on the labour market, two interlinked aspects are to 
be considered: the impact on wages and on unemployment. Starting from economic theory, the 
fact that in a competitive labour market the labour demand curve is downward sloping implies 
that immigration, that is to be viewed as an increase in the number of workers in the economy, 
negatively affects the wages of natives. Though, the amount of such a reduction depends on the 
elasticity of the labour supply curve. Borjas (2003) implements a simple theoretical model to 
describe what are the consequences of migration in the host Country economy, when the labour 
supply curve is perfectly inelastic. He assumes that labour is homogeneous, hence natives and 
migrants are perfect substitutes in production, that the production function depends on just two 
inputs, capital and labour, and that the supply of capital is inelastic. Moreover, the model works 
on the assumption of a competitive economy, in which the prices of inputs correspond to the 
value of their marginal product, starting from an equilibrium condition. In such a scenario, the 
increase of workforce due to migration flows causes the wages of native workers to fall, but the 
overall economy’s output increases thanks to what Borjas call “immigration surplus”, that is an 
increase in national income accruing to natives. The effects are the same if the assumption of a 
rigid supply curve is removed. The additional effect of migration flows in an economy in which 
the labour supply curve is elastic is that they increase the unemployment rate of natives, namely 
of those natives who are not willing to work at the lower, post-immigration wage. In both 
models the overall economic output increases and the gain is absorbed by employers, who, thus, 
have a conflict of interest with workers. 
Peri G. (2010) empirically analyses the impact of migration on employment and income (GDP) 
in the United States. He considers the effect of net variations in migration on the change in 
various components of the output at the state level (GSP), among which natives’ employment 
and total factor productivity. Peri’s findings show that a 1% increase in net migration flows has 
a positive but not statistically significant effect on total employment in the short run, but it has 
a positive and significant impact in the long run (one decade). Moreover, the estimated 
coefficient for 1% variation in net migration is higher than 1, meaning that migration creates 
new jobs for natives (crowding in). 
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The second determinant of natives’ perception of migrants is their fiscal impact. If there 
existed no distortionary taxes and transfers, immigration would cause similar reactions in 
similar social groups, because it would have a similar impact on labour market and labour 
income. Though, government redistributive policy causes natives post-tax income to change in 
different ways in response to migration and thus different political coalitions may organise 
around migration. In a theoretical framework, migrants are likely both to pay taxes and to 
benefit from government transfers and public services, hence a priori they could have a 
negative as well as a positive impact on the fiscal balance. However, the sign of their actual 
contribution depends on their skill composition. If, like in the Italian case, migrants are mainly 
low-skilled, their access to the labour market will lower low-skilled wages and, what we are 
more interested in, they will decrease the post-tax income of the more skilled workers. Indeed, 
since high-skilled workers usually perceive higher income and progressive tax schemes are in 
place, they are going to bear migration fiscal costs by paying higher taxes to finance migrants’ 
public assistance. Hanson et al. (2005) analyse how exposure to migrants’ fiscal pressure affects 
natives’ support to free migration in the United States. They measure fiscal exposure as a 
dichotomous variable accounting for two different aspects: fiscal pressure and migrants’ share. 
This binary variable takes value one if welfare generosity of a certain State is above the national 
median welfare spending per native and, at the same time, the ratio of immigrants to natives is 
above a specific threshold. To measure the effect of this variable, interacted also with education 
levels, on natives’ support for migration, Hanson et al. estimate a probit model. Their main 
finding is in line with theoretical explanations: college educated natives have a more restrictive 
policy view in those States in which the welfare system is very generous. 
So far, only studies concerning migrants in the Unites States have been presented, though also 
the existing literature treating the migration phenomenon in the European Union is large. 
Indeed, due to the increasing flows of migrants, coexistence, discrimination and integration 
have become important issues in public policy and election campaigns of the European 
governments in the least years. 
Economists traditionally focus on the immigration impact on the labour market, on 
wages and on fiscal transfers, but they do not fail to take into account also social and cultural 
aspects affecting natives’ perceptions. For example, Card, Dustmann and Preston (2009) 
consider two dimensions, which they call the ‘direct economic effect’ and the ‘compositional 
amenities effect’. They find that both economic concerns, related to job opportunities and wage 
reduction, and compositional effects, concerning the changing composition of local 
communities, play a role in shaping natives’ perception of immigrants. Though, compositional 
amenities concerns contribute to a larger extent to explain the variation in opinions towards 
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immigration policy between different demographic groups, such as high-low educated, or 
younger-older people. The same two channels are considered by Senik et al. (2011), who use 
data from the first round of the European Social Survey to investigate whether the perceived 
share of immigrants in the population has a negative impact on the support for the welfare state. 
A probit model is constructed using as independent variables not only the perceived share of 
immigrants, but also some interaction terms between the perceived share and, on one hand the 
“taste channel” and on the other hand the “economic channel”.  
Also D’Hombres and Nunziata (2015) exploit the European Social Survey dataset to 
analyse natives’ attitude toward migrants. In particular, they focus on studying the different 
approaches that different natives’ demographic groups have toward migrants. They exploit 
exogenous changes in compulsory-education legislation to identify the effect of education on 
attitudes towards immigrants. What emerges from this study is that more educated people 
appear to have more positive attitudes toward immigration, which can be explained both by 
economic and by non-economic factors. These findings suggest that policies boosting education 
could be a valid instrument to enhance integration in society characterised by large immigration 
flows. 
The two different ways to interpret natives’ attitudes toward migrants, which, when negative, 
is discrimination, lead back two the interpretations of two Nobelists: Becker (1957), claiming 
that the only driver of discrimination is taste, and Arrow (1973). The latter, in his article “The 
theory of discrimination”, focuses on racial discrimination and devotes a section to analyse 
discrimination from employers. Arrow defines discrimination in the labour market as the 
evaluation process not only of the worker’s productivity, but also of some of his/her personal 
characteristics. Because of their prejudices, employers prefer to hire native workers rather than 
migrant ones and are willing to pay an opportunity cost, even though detrimental to their profits. 
Arrow explains the source of discrimination saying that discriminatory behaviours are led not 
only by employers’ distaste, but also by some rational beliefs based on economic theory. 
Indeed, in Arrow’s model, employers, who cannot know some unobservable workers’ 
characteristics, like ability and productivity, choose whom to hire on the basis of their 
preconceived ideas, such as that non-natives are less likely to be highly productive. Hence, there 
exists a rational justification to give them a lower wage. This behaviour may generate a vicious 
cycle, since foreign workers will be less willing to participate the labour market, or, 
discouraged, they will underinvest in their human capital. The kind of theory just described, 
which explains race inequality through stereotypes, is called statistical discrimination. 
 All the studies I have mentioned so far are focused on searching for the causes that drive 
natives’ behaviour towards immigrants, thus adopting host Country nationals’ point of view. 
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The two studies which follow, instead, are ones of the few articles which speak about the effects 
of discrimination on immigrant population, bringing attention to the opinions of immigrants 
themselves.  
K. Vancluysen and M. Van Craen (2010) replicate a study conducted on US migrants to analyse 
the relationship between perceived discrimination and integration using data about Flemish 
Belgian migrants of Moroccan and Turkish descent. The relationship between these variables 
has been the focus of many studies because in the social science literature there exist two 
opposing theories explaining the relationship between integration and discrimination. On one 
hand, there is the assimilation theory (Gordon, 1964), stating that the more an individual is 
integrated in the host society and the less she/he is discriminated, precisely because he/she 
assimilated natives’ attitudes and habits. On the other hand, the ethnic competition theory 
(Portes et al., 1980) says that the more integrated a migrant is and the more she/he will perceive 
discrimination. In fact, a higher level of familiarity with the culture of natives means a greater 
consciousness of discrimination. Hence, according to the first theory, integration should have a 
positive effect on discrimination, whereas according to the latter one it should have a negative 
impact. K. Vancluysen and M. Van Craen regress measures of perceived personal 
discrimination and of ethnic group discrimination on indicators of both structural (occupational 
position, educational attainments) and socio-cultural integration (chatting with native 
neighbours, majority language proficiency). They find that migrants more socially integrated 
are less likely to perceive group discrimination, though no relation is found between social-
cultural integration and personal experiences of discrimination. Hence, no clear support was 
found for either the assimilation theory or the ethnic competition theory. 
The sociologist Mirna Safi investigates what are the determinants of migrants’ life 
satisfaction and why it is lower than natives’ satisfaction even after many years spent in the 
host Country (2009). She finds out that being an immigrant has a negative effect on happiness 
and life satisfaction and that, unlike it can be thought, this negative effect does not fade away 
with time. To observe an increase in migrants’ life satisfaction it is necessary to wait for a 20-
year migration duration, or to take into consideration those second generation migrants with at 
least one native parent (generation 2,5). The difference in life satisfaction between natives and 
immigrants can be partially explained by the impact of perceived discrimination and the same 
difference about second generation and generation 2,5 is fully explained by discrimination. The 
relation between life satisfaction and discrimination may not be causal because of omitted 
variables (personality traits, physical attractiveness, sexual orientation) bias. In order to 
overcome this problem, Safi instruments perceived discrimination with the affiliation with two 
religious communities (Judaism and Islam). Such an instrumental variable is informative 
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because defining themselves as members of a religious community, which may be perceived as 
discriminated against, strongly correlates with perceived discrimination. The same negative 
correlation between life satisfaction and discrimination is presented also in one of the next 
sections, though through a simple weighted least squares model exploiting data about Italian 
immigrants. 
 D. W. Johnston and G. Lordan, in their article in the Journal of Health Economics 
(2010), develop the topic of discrimination and analyse the impact of discrimination on various 
health outcomes of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims resident in the United Kingdom. They 
use data referring to such a treatment group from 1999 to 2004, because they want to exploit 
the exogenous change in natives’ attitude towards Muslims consequent to the 9/11 terrorist 
attack. Johnston and Lordan implement a difference-in-differences estimator considering the 
difference between two different time periods, before and after September 11th 2001, and 
between two demographic groups: Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims, the treatment group, 
and non-Muslim Indians, the control group. The findings of this study tell us that both objective 
indicators of health status, such as blood pressure, BMI (Body Mass Index), or cholesterol, and 
subjective ones, like perceived health status, worsened for Muslims relative to the control group 
after the terrorist attacks. This negative impact is explained through both direct and indirect 
effects of discrimination and health. Direct effects consist of the increased stress that people 
discriminated against must bear: higher levels of stress negatively affect health by, for instance, 
increasing blood pressure. On the other hand, indirect effects concern the fact that 
discrimination may push people to withdraw from the labour market or to be willing to work 
less hours than they could, for example preferring to work part-time rather than full-time; such 
worse economic outcomes may increase the level of stress and negatively impact on health. 
Also this thesis investigates the impact that discrimination has on health, though adopting an 
instrumental variable strategy. 
 A second paper by F. Roy and W. M. Rodgers (2011) analyses the impact of increased 
discrimination following the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 on economic outcomes of 
Muslim workers in the United States. Three different treatment groups were identified, 
characterised by different levels of risk of targeting: the group at highest risk is composed of 
Muslims coming from Middle-Eastern Countries, such as Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Iran 
and Afghanistan. The other two groups are formed by adding to immigrants of the first group 
immigrants coming from different Muslim-majority Countries, but less linked with the origins 
of the terrorists. The comparison group which is selected to implement the difference-in-
differences estimator is made of first and second generation immigrants coming from non-
Muslim-majority Countries. Roy and Rodgers find out that the employment gap among target 
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group men aged between 16 and 25 and the comparison group widened shortly after 9/11. This 
result, though, does not hold for older Muslim immigrants, for whom there is no change in the 
employment rate. Also the number of hours worked per week reduced after the terrorist attacks 
for the younger immigrants in the target group, while the same variable did not change for the 
older. The negative effects of 9/11 on both economic outcomes appear to dissipate with time: 
by the end of 2004 they had almost disappeared. However, it is difficult to determine whether 
this negative impact on employment rate and on the number of hours worked per week is due 
to a rise in discrimination or to the antiterrorism programs which were put in place. Roy and 
Rodgers identify two main pieces of evidence suggestive of a growth in discrimination against 
immigrant men: first, Muslims with age and nativity profiles closer to the terrorists’ ones 
experienced larger declines in their employment, second, the decline in the employment and 
earnings of Muslims associated with 9-11 began to dissipate after 2002, just when some of the 
salient anti-terrorism programs and laws were initiated. 
Relative to the existing literature, this paper presents an original and new analysis for 
two main reasons: it focuses on immigrants’ point of view and opinions rather than on natives’ 
ones and, secondly, it uses Italian data. Although papers describing immigrants’ perceptions 
already exist, even if they are quite rare, none of them is based on data from the ISTAT survey 
“Condizione e Integrazione Sociale dei Cittadini Stranieri”, which was published in 2016. 
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3. Data description 
 
The ISTAT survey “Condizione e Integrazione Sociale dei Cittadini Stranieri” (“Condition and 
social integration of foreign citizens”) was carried out in 2011 and addresses households 
resident in Italy with at least one foreign citizen among their members. 
For the survey purposes, a ‘household’ is defined as a set of cohabitant people, who may 
be married, relatives or tied by emotional bonds, and ‘foreign citizens’ are identified on the 
basis of their citizenship and not of their Country of birth. 
Italian citizens from birth, who are members of the surveyed families, were not interviewed, 
but information about their sociodemographic features (gender, age, country of birth, etc.) were 
collected anyway. 
The sample considered is composed of 9.533 households, a total of 25.326 individual 
observations, living in 833 different Italian municipalities. Foreign citizens are 20.379 of them, 
696 are naturalized Italian and 4.251 are Italian citizens from birth, for whom all observations, 
except for the ones relative to sociodemographic variables, are missing. 
For people aged less than 14, as well as for people temporary missing, answers were collected 
as proxies, that is a family member of age was interviewed at their place. 
The survey is divided into seven main sections: 
1. Family 
2. Education 
3. Migration history 
4. Working life 
5. Discrimination 
6. Health 
7. Integration 
I am going to focus mainly on the last three sections, analysing also the background 
information, such as education and occupation. 
The survey makes a distinction between “foreign immigrants” and “naturalized 
immigrants”. More precisely, observations are gathered in eight different target groups (Table 
3): foreign immigrants, second generation non-naturalized immigrants, first generation 
naturalized immigrants, second generation naturalized immigrants, people born abroad who had 
Italian citizenship at birth, people born in Italy who had Italian citizenship at birth, Italian 
citizens born abroad and Italian citizens born in Italy.  
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Table 3-Sample individuals divided by target groups 
Target groups  
Foreign first generation 17.544 
Foreign second generation 2.821 
Naturalized first generation 497 
Naturalized second generation 199 
Ex-Italian nationals born abroad 1 
Ex-Italian nationals born in Italy 13 
Italian nationals born abroad 154 
Italian nationals born in Italy 4.097 
Total 25.326 
 
A further distinction that is made is about generations. Excluding Italian nationals responding 
to the survey, the variable ‘generation’ can take on five different values: 1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75 and 
2. By focusing on these five generations, I am excluding those target groups including ex-Italian 
nationals and Italian nationals. It is important to notice, in order to correctly understand the 
tables that follow, that target groups 1 and 3, referring to first generation immigrants, actually 
include observations belonging to generations 1, 1.25, 1.5 and 1.75. Belonging to a certain 
generation conveys information both about citizenship and about the age of the immigrant. 
Analysing the data, I observe that people belonging to generations closer to the second one are 
younger (Table 4). For example, migrants belonging to the first generation are older than 18, 
while migrants of generation 1.75 can be newborn, by conventional definition. People 
belonging to generation 1.25 are older than 13 and those belonging to generation 1.75 can be 
older than 6, always by definition. Despite in the ISTAT dataset information about age is 
aggregated in groups and precise ages of the respondents are not available, their specific age is 
deductible by comparing the sociological definition of the different generations with the 
available data. Moreover, as to citizenship, the share of naturalized migrants, that is those who 
got Italian citizenship, increases as they belong to generations closer to 2. Indeed, as it is shown 
in Table 5, while the proportion of naturalized migrants vis à vis the share of foreign ones is 
about 2% for the first and the 1.25 generations, it becomes 4% for generation 1.5 and almost 
6% for generation 1.75. Finally, the same share reaches about 7% for second generation 
migrants. In order to better understand the composition of naturalized migrants, I constructed a 
table crossing data about EU citizenship and data about naturalization (Table 6). Only non-
naturalized people were supposed to specify whether they are EU citizens or not and what 
emerges is that 65% of non-naturalized migrants are not EU citizens. 
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The following chart gives information about Italian legislation for the acquisition of Italian 
citizenship, which is regulated by law n.91 of February 5th 1992. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-Sample individuals divided by generation and age 
 Generation 
Age 2 1.75 1.5 1.25 1 
0-4 1.404 147 - - - 
5-9 937 414 54 - - 
10-14 452 377 417 8 - 
15-19 147 200 469 261 18 
20-24 51 82 264 462 591 
25-29 9 23 76 294 1.549 
30-34 5 8 30 129 2.346 
35-39 3 7 11 53 2.535 
40-44 1 3 5 16 2.286 
45-49 2 5 2 11 1.793 
50-54 1 3 2 4 1.343 
>55 8 5 10 7 1.721 
Total 3.020 1.274 1.340 1.245 14.182 
Italian Citizenship 
In Italy citizenship is acquired on the basis of the ius sanguinis principle, that is children of 
Italian nationals get Italian citizenship at birth (art.1 law 91/92). 
In really specific cases also ius soli is applied: when a child is born by unknown or 
stateless parents or when he/she is abandoned, then he/she acquires Italian citizenship (art. 1, 
comma 1 letter b and comma 2 law n. 91/92). 
People aged less than 18 can become Italian citizens also when adopted by Italian 
nationals, or when their parents are naturalized Italian. In this latter case, in order for Italian 
citizenship to be acquired, it is necessary that the children live together with their parents 
(art.14 law 91/92). 
People of age can become Italian citizens by marrying an Italian national: after two 
years of marriage they can ask for Italian citizenship. In case children are born during the 
marriage, the length of stay to be entitled to get the citizenship reduces. 
A second case giving the right to foreign nationals to get Italian citizenship is by length of 
residence in Italy. Non-EU citizens can acquire Italian citizenship after having being resident 
in Italy at least for ten years, while for EU citizens the term is just four years. 
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Table 5-Sample division into target groups and generations 
 Generation 
Target group 1.75 1.5 1.25 1 2 
Foreign first generation   1.201 1.282 1.219 13.842 
               
-    
  94,30% 95,70% 97,90% 97,60% 
               
-    
Foreign second generation   
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
2.821 
  
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
93,40% 
Naturalized first generation   73 58 26 340 
               
-    
  5,70% 4,30% 2,10% 2,40% 
               
-    
Naturalized second generation   
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
199 
  
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
               
-    
6,60% 
 
Table 6-EU citizenship on non-naturalized migrants 
 EU citizenship  
Non- naturalized No Yes Total 
Frequency 9.041 4.801 13.842 
% 65,32% 34,68% 100,00% 
 
To make sure that all the observations for all the variables are available and to simplify the 
interpretation of the data, only observations referring to first generation migrants are taken into 
account. As already mentioned, first generation migrants are defined as people aged more than 
18 who are either foreign citizens who migrated to Italy, or naturalized Italian citizens. On the 
whole, 14.182 observations out of 25.326 are kept (see Table 7). A disadvantage of keeping 
only this data is that we have a loss of information, for instance all the information about 
children are lost. 
Table 7-Number of observations in the different subsamples 
 N° observations 
Whole sample 25.326 
Foreign and naturalized migrants 
(whole sample excluding ex-Italian nationals and Italian nationals) 
21.061 
First generation migrants 14.182 
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Table 8-Missing observations 
  Available obs. Missing obs. 
DISCRIMINATION     
Discrimination 14.144 38 
Discrimination at workplace 11.704 2.478 
Discrimination in the health care system 13.549 633 
Discrimination in public offices 13.821 361 
Discrimination by neighbours 13.833 349 
Verbal insults 14.182 0 
Threats and assaults 14.182 0 
INTEGRATION     
Interest in Italian politics 14.182 0 
Italian TV news 13.177 1.005 
Italian newspapers 6.254 7.928 
Italian television language 13.177 1.005 
ITALIAN LANGUAGE      
Ability to read Italian 14.182 0 
Ability to write Italian 14.182 0 
Ability to speak Italian 14.182 0 
Ability to understand Italian 14.182 0 
Ability to understand Italian TV news 13.688 494 
Language spoken with family 13.115 1.067 
Language more frequently spoken with friends 13.842 340 
WELLBEING     
Life satisfaction 14.182 0 
Loneliness 14.182 0 
Mental Health 14.182 0 
Perceived Health Status 13.956 226 
Absence of chronic health problems 13.878 304 
CULTURE   
Religion 13.714 468 
EMPLOYMENT   
Active in the labour market 10.895 3.285 
Occupation 14.022 160 
RESIDENCE     
Region 6.154 8.028 
Province 6.154 8.028 
Municipality 6.069 8.113 
 
Despite first generation immigrants were supposed to answer to all the questions in the survey, 
many answers are missing: for some variables less than 14.182 observations are available, 
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which will affect the estimation models. The above table (Table 8) conveys synthetic 
information about the missing observations for questions related to different dimensions. 
Some sociodemographic features follow, to better understand the composition of this 
subsample. First of all, 42% of the observations is men, while 58% is women.  
The first three foreign Countries with the highest birth rate of migrants in our sample are 
Romania (23%), Albania (11%) and Morocco (9%). Table 9 reports these numbers and shows 
the share of migrants’ citizenship, while Table 10 displays the distribution of the main 
sociodemographic characteristics in the sample. 
Table 9-Citizenship distribution in the sample 
Citizenship N % Cum % 
Romania 3334 23.5 23.5 
Poland 517 3.6 27.2 
Albania 1639 11.6 38.7 
Ukraine 796 5.6 44.3 
Moldova 331 2.3 46.7 
Macedonia 198 1.4 48.1 
Morocco 1260 8.9 56.9 
Tunisia 409 2.9 59.8 
Egypt 128 0.9 60.7 
China 446 3.1 63.9 
Philippines 378 2.7 66.5 
India 250 1.8 68.3 
Bangladesh 212 1.5 69.8 
Ecuador 199 1.4 71.2 
Peru 198 1.4 72.6 
Oceania 4 0.0 72.6 
Others 3883 27.4 100.0 
Total 14.182 100.0  
 
What is important to notice in Table 10 is the uneven distribution in terms of macro-area of 
residence of surveyed migrants: 36.4% of respondents lives in Northern Italy, 46,3% in the 
South or in the Isles and only 17,4% comes from the Centre. This distribution in the sample is 
even more weird if we think that the population of Italian migrants is much more concentrated 
in the North, while in the South the density of immigrants’ population is really low. The reasons 
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of such an unbalanced sample and how I coped with it will be explained in the “Empirical 
strategy” section. 
Table 10-Distribution of the main sociodemographic variables in the sample 
 N % 
Sex   
Male 6.027 42,5 
Female 8.155 57,5 
Age distribution   
Under 30 2.158 15,22 
30-54 10.303 72,65 
Over 54 1.721 12,14 
Employment status   
Employed 9.696 68,37 
Unemployed 1.199 8,45 
Inactive 3.287 23,18 
Education level   
No education 2.225 15,69 
Middle level 10.196 71,89 
Tertiary education 1.761 12,42 
Religion   
Muslims 3.682 26,85 
Others 10.032 73,15 
Municipality size   
     Main municipalities 3.583 25,26 
     >10.000 7.278 51,32 
     < 10.000 3.321 23,42 
Macro-area of residence   
     North 5.161 36,39 
     Centre 2.460 17,35 
     South and Isles 6.561 46,26 
 
As to where migrants currently live in Italy, information about the region, the province and the 
municipality in which they live were suppressed. The only information available is the first and, 
possibly, the subsequent provinces and municipalities in which migrants lived once arrived in 
Italy. For those migrants who are still living in the same municipality since their arrival, no 
specific information is available. So, observations as to the first municipality is available only 
for 6.154 individuals, that is all those who have changed municipality of residence during their 
stay. Nevertheless, some of the municipalities contained in the dataset are not matched to the 
correct province, or they do not even exist. In this latter case the respondent indicated either 
his/her village instead of the municipality (e.g. Borgo San Bernardino, Roggiano Valtravaglia), 
or the name of the municipality was incorrectly specified. However, only 99 observations in 
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the whole sample (85 in the subsample retained) are excluded due to this kind of problems. 
Excluding these incorrect observations and observations for those individuals who are still 
living in the same municipality since their arrival, only 6.069 observations are left (see Table 
8). Moreover, data about municipalities is not easily manageable because ISTAT codes, 
containing both the municipality number and the code of the province to which the municipality 
belongs, are not used: municipalities are indicated with a numeric code representing the 
progressive number of that municipality in its province. However, the variable ‘municipality’ 
could be constructed starting from the available data so that each municipality is identified by 
a unique value corresponding to the ISTAT code. Also, ISTAT dataset allows to distinguish 
among metropolitan municipalities, municipalities with more than 10.000 inhabitants and the 
smallest ones, counting less than 10.000 residents. On the basis of this distinction I constructed 
a table (Table 11), which reports some characteristics of the sample divided by municipality 
size. This highlights that a larger share of immigrants with a low education, as well as a higher 
proportion of unemployed, is to be found in the smaller municipalities. It is also interesting to 
notice that there is a higher concentration of Muslims in the lower categories and that, 
independent of the kind of municipality, women are more than men. The last characteristic 
considered in Table 11, Index of Mental Health, is almost the same for metropolitan 
municipalities and for the ones with more than 10.000 inhabitants, but it appears to be slightly 
above the sample average, thus indicating a better mental health status, in the smallest 
municipalities. This index goes from a minimum score of 7,6 to a maximum of 69,4 and the 
mean for the whole sample is 53,48. Even if not reported here, t-tests have been run and they 
indicate that the difference between the Index of Mental Health between Southern observations 
and observations from Northern or Central Italy are statistically significant. 
Table 11-Characteristics of ISTAT Sample by Municipality Size 
Municipality 
size 
Mean 
Sex 
Mean 
Age 
Mean 
Occupation 
Mean 
Education 
Mean Muslim 
Religion 
Mean 
Mental 
Health 
Metropolitan 
municipalities 
(25%) 
0,58 0,54 0,08 0,15 0,19 
53,37 
>10.000 (51%) 0,58 0,50 0,12 0,13 0,28 53,37 
< 10.000 (23%) 0,56 0,48 0,12 0,09 0,33 53,83 
 
Unlike municipality data, data about provinces is easily manageable because each of the 
provinces indicated corresponds to the correct ISTAT code. Excluding, also in this case, those 
provinces where migrants live since their arrival, which are unknow, 6.154 observations are 
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left. Thanks to the availability of this data I was able to group all the observations into the 
twenty Italian regions. Nevertheless, information about the current region of residence was 
suppressed from the data, so the variable I constructed indicates whether we have information 
about the penultimate province and hence region, in which the respondents lived. This is the 
most up-to-date information available about residence. In other words, ISTAT dataset contains 
residence information, even though not really specific and precise, about migrants who moved 
at least once from their initial province of residence. This kind of information is available for 
6.154 individuals, while there is no information about the current residence of 8.028 
respondents. 
Exploiting this new information, I constructed two tables: Table 12 presents the same 
sociodemographic characteristics reported in the previous table, but distinguishing by region, 
whereas Table 13 illustrates the same characteristics but distinguishes between migrants for 
whom a recent residence information is available (who moved) and migrants for whom no up-
to-date information is provided (who did not move). In Table 12 regions are ordered by GDP 
level as reported by ISTAT in “Conti economici territoriali” (December 12th 2016): the first 
regions are the ones with a higher GDP per capita. It can be noticed that in the bottom part of 
the table, in those regions with the lowest GDP per capita, the share of employed migrants is 
very high, always above 90%, while the proportion of migrants with tertiary education is quite 
low, being below 15%. In Table 13 tis interesting to notice that there are statistically significant 
differences for almost all the parameters considered between migrants who moved and those 
who did not change their residence since their first arrival. 
The same migrants’ characteristics are presented also in Table 14, which divides migrants 
according to their macro-are of residence, North, Centre, South and Isles. 
Table 15 presents results concerning education and employment distinguishing by sex. 
As far as the education level is concerned, 16% of the observations has no education, while 
12% has a university degree or a PhD. Among women 15% of them has a tertiary education, 
while the corresponding percentage for men is 9%. As to first generation migrants’ current job, 
most of them (59%) is subject to an employer and inactive people are 23%. Inactive people are 
spread over the different age groups, only 2% of them is currently attending a school or a 
university and 85% of them is women. 83% of men is working, whereas only 58% of women 
is. The ISTAT survey includes also questions aimed to get specific information about the job 
of each respondent; one particular question is about the kind of job, such as employed, 
professional, self-employed, but only 295 people answered. 
There is some inconsistency in the data, because if the occupational condition of respondents 
is crossed with the number of employees some state to have, it emerges that even people who 
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claim to be inactive or unemployed said they have some employees. What’s more, only 1.033 
observations are available for this question. Anyway, the dataset contains information about the 
specific occupation of every respondent. It is interesting to notice that 29% of women are 
employed in cleaning, personal and cultural services and another 25% in domestic activities, 
whereas 22% of men is workers specialised in the construction industry or in buildings’ 
maintenance. 
Table 12-Characteristics of ISTAT Sample by Region 
Region  
 Female  
Older than 
40 
Employed 
Tertiary 
education 
Muslim 
Religion 
Index of 
Mental 
Health 
Trentino-Alto 
Adige (1%) 
56% 56% 84% 19% 40% 54,02 
Lombardy (13%) 49% 52% 89% 16% 27% 53,19 
Valle d'Aosta  58% 58% 90% 15% 34% 53,97 
Emilia Romagna 
(7%) 
53% 55% 87% 15% 33% 52,62 
Lazio (11%) 52% 53% 90% 13% 15% 53,98 
Veneto (9%) 51% 52% 88% 16% 24% 54,06 
Liguria (1%) 47% 60% 92% 15% 37% 52,83 
Toscana (5%) 57% 58% 89% 18% 25% 53,05 
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia (1%) 
62% 47% 91% 18% 18% 55,06 
Piemonte (4%) 53% 61% 89% 14% 25% 52,06 
Marche (2%) 53% 48% 86% 9% 27% 52,26 
Abruzzo (5%) 59% 53% 89% 16% 26% 53,17 
Umbria (1%) 58% 57% 89% 18% 29% 51,34 
Basilicata  62% 67% 95% 15% 23% 51,77 
Sardinia (2%) 61% 54% 89% 18% 27% 52,51 
Molise 64% 62% 89% 11% 20% 53,45 
Campania (11%) 57% 58% 94% 13% 22% 53,01 
Puglia (6%) 41% 56% 92% 9% 28% 52,52 
Sicilia (7%) 44% 56% 92% 8% 40% 53,44 
Calabria (3%) 50% 54% 91% 10% 33% 51,72 
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Table 13-Summary statistics in subsamples based on residence information 
 All Did not move Moved T-test (p-value) 
Observations 14.182 8.028 6.154 
(H0: mean1-
mean2=0) 
Age (mean) 
8,67 8,52 8,87 0.0000 
[2,00] [2,09] [1,87]  
% Female 
57,50% 61,48% 52,31% 0.0000 
[0,49] [0,49] [0,50]  
Education level (mean) 
2,45 2,42 2,49 0.0001 
[1,09] [1,08] [1,09]  
% Employed 
88,99% 88,12% 90,00% 0.0017 
[0,31] [0,32] [0,30]  
Ability to read Italian 
(mean) 
3,03 2,92 3,18 0.0000 
[0,96] [0,99] [0,90]  
Ability to write Italian 
(mean) 
2,81 2,71 2,95 0.0000 
[0,99] [1,00] [0,95]  
Ability to speak Italian 
(mean) 
3,36 3,27 3,48 0.0000 
[0,82] [0,87] [0,73]  
Ability to understand 
Italian (mean) 
3,38 3,29 3,50 0.0000 
[0,81] [0,85] [0,72]  
% Italian television 
language 
76,66% 75,15% 78,64% 0.0000 
[0,42] [0,43] [0,41]  
% Italian TV news 
84,09% 80,65% 88,58% 0.0000 
[0,37] [0,40] [0,32]  
% Police control at 
least once a month 
78,48% 77,92% 79,20% 0.0842 
[0,41] [0,41] [0,41]  
% Police very or quite 
effective 
80,35% 80,16% 80,60% 0.5124 
[0,40] [0,40] [0,40]  
% Discriminated at 
work 
17,89% 14,23% 21,90% 0.0000 
[0,38] [0,35] [0,41]  
% Discriminated by 
neighbours 
6,88% 5,27% 8,99% 0.0000 
[0,25] [0,22] [0,29]  
% Discriminated in the 
Healthcare system 
3,24% 2,72% 3,91% 0.0001 
[0,18] [0,16] [0,19]  
% Discriminated in 
public offices 
8,43% 7,01% 10,28% 0.0000 
[0,28] [0,26] [0,30]  
% Discriminated by 
verbal insults 
11,16% 8,50% 14,64% 0.0000 
[0,31] [0,28] [0,35]  
Length of stay (mean) 
15,87 14,54 17,61 0.0000 
[6,81] [6,42] [6,91]  
The variables whose values are not expressed as percentage are categorical ones: age is aggregated (4=15-19 yrs,12=more 
than 55yrs), education level (0=no education, 5=tertiary education), Italian proficiency indices (1=not good at all, 4=very 
good). Length of stay is a discrete variable, going from a minimum of 5 years to a maximum of 74. Column 4 reports p-values 
for the test of the equality of means, under the null hypothesis that the means for the two subsamples (columns 2 and 3) are 
equal. Standard deviations in square brackets. 
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Table 14-Summary statistics in subsamples based on residence information (macro-areas) 
  North Centre 
South and 
Isles 
Observations 5.161 2.460 6.561 
Age (mean) 
49,97% 52,56% 49,86% 
[0,50] [0,50] [0,50] 
% Female 
56,50% 58,09% 58,07% 
[0,50] [0,49] [0,49] 
Education level (mean) 
14,67% 14,23% 9,97% 
[0,35] [0,35] [0,30] 
% Employed 
85,58% 89,20% 91,63% 
[0,35] [0,31] [0,28] 
Ability to read Italian 
(mean) 
3,15 3,22 2,87 
[0,97] [0,89] [0,95] 
Ability to write Italian 
(mean) 
2,92 2,99 2,66 
[1,01] [0,92] [0,97] 
Ability to speak Italian 
(mean) 
3,3900 3,5200 3,2700 
[0,87] [0,76] [0,79] 
Ability to understand 
Italian (mean) 
3,4100 3,5400 3,3000 
[0,85] [0,75] [0,78] 
% Italian television 
language 
72,92% 76,73% 79,60% 
[0,44] [0,42] [0,40] 
% Italian TV news 
81,50% 89,30% 84,85% 
[0,39] [0,31] [0,36] 
% Police control at least 
once a month 
84,74% 82,08% 72,19% 
[0,36] [0,38] [0,45] 
% Police very or quite 
effective 
87,10% 84,15% 73,62% 
[0,34] [0,37] [0,44] 
% Discriminated at work 
17,64% 15,04% 19,17% 
[0,38] [0,36] [0,39] 
% Discriminated by 
neighbours 
6,83% 5,65% 7,39% 
[0,25] [0,23] [0,26] 
% Discriminated in the 
Healthcare system 
3,27% 3,08% 3,28% 
[0,18] [0,17] [0,18] 
% Discriminated in 
public offices 
8,70% 8,57% 8,16% 
[0,28] [0,28] [0,27] 
% Discriminated by 
verbal insults 
10,44% 9,96% 12,18% 
[0,31] [0,30] [0,33] 
Length of stay (mean) 
16,23 16,51 15,35 
[6,58] [6,92] [6,89] 
The variables whose values are not expressed as percentage are categorical ones: 
age is aggregated (4=15-19 yrs,12=more than 55yrs), education level (0=no 
education, 5=tertiary education), Italian proficiency indices (1=not good at all, 
4=very good). Length of stay is a discrete variable, going from a minimum of 5 
yrs to a maximum of 74. Standard deviations in square brackets. 
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Table 15-Distribution of education and employment for men and women 
 Sex  
 Male Female Total 
Education level    
No education 1.102 1.123 2.225 
 49,50% 50,50% 100,00% 
 18,30% 13,80% 15,70% 
Middle level education 4.381 5.815 10.196 
 43,00% 57,00% 100,00% 
 72,70% 71,30% 71,90% 
Tertiary education 544 1.217 1.761 
 30,90% 69,10% 100,00% 
 9,00% 14,90% 12,40% 
Total 6.027 8.155 14.182 
 42,50% 57,50% 100,00% 
 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 
Employment status    
Employed 5.003 4.693 9.696 
 51,60% 48,40% 100,00% 
 83,00% 57,50% 68,40% 
Unemployed 526 673 1.199 
 43,90% 56,10% 100,00% 
 8,70% 8,30% 8,50% 
Inactive 498 2.789 3.287 
 15,20% 84,80% 100,00% 
 8,30% 34,20% 23,20% 
Total 6.027 8.155 14.182 
 42,50% 57,50% 100,00% 
 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 
 
The first survey section of great interest is the one about discrimination, which is divided into 
four different parts: discrimination at the workplace, discrimination in searching for a job, 
discrimination in everyday life and insults. Answers are based on the concept of discrimination 
defined as the way of treating some people in a less favourable way relative to the others 
because of their physical, mental, or personal characteristics. 
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Table 16 illustrates how answers to discrimination questions are distributed in the sample. The 
different kinds of discrimination considered in the survey are reported in the table in decreasing 
order: the first items are the ones for which migrants perceive to be more discriminated against. 
Table 16- Discrimination perception (sample distribution) 
  N % 
Perceived discrimination   
No 10.057 71,10 
Yes 4.078 28,90 
Total 14.144 100 
Discrimination at work 
  
No 9.610 82,11 
Yes 2.094 17,89 
Total 11.704 100 
Verbal insults 
  
No 12.599 88,84 
Yes 1.583 11,16 
Total 14.182 100 
Discrimination in search of a house 
  
No 11.255 88,92 
Yes 1.402 11,08 
Total 12.657 100 
Discrimination in search of a job 
  
No 11.740 90,59 
Yes 1.220 9,41 
Total 12.960 100 
Discrimination in public offices 
  
No 12.656 91,57 
Yes 1.165 8,43 
Total 13.821 100 
Discrimination in the residence 
neighbourhood 
  
No 12.881 93,12 
Yes 952 6,88 
Total 13.833 100 
Threats and Insults 
  
No 13.590 95,83 
Yes 592 4,17 
Total 14.182 100 
Discrimination in the Health Care system 
  
No 13.110 96,76 
Yes 439 3,24 
Total 13.549 100 
Discrimination in asking for car insurance 
  
No 11.167 97,73 
Yes 259 2,27 
Total 11.426 100 
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Respondents to questions about discrimination at work are 11.704, because people who have 
never worked in Italy during their stay are excluded. 18% of people interviewed in this section 
has felt discriminated: 19% of the responding men and 16% of the responding women. People 
who are currently working are 1.711 and 48% of them felt discriminated in their current job, 
mainly by their employer. Respondents were asked which is the reason why they are 
discriminated against and they could choose among eleven alternative answers. The most 
frequent discrimination reason migrants indicated is being foreign. Another alternative reason 
why they are discriminated against is gender: 23% of women feels discriminated because they 
are women, while the corresponding percentage for men is just 3%. 
Respondents to the subsection “discrimination in search of a job” are all the 14.182 individuals. 
1.220 individuals, that is 9% of the subsample, felt discriminated in searching for a job. Also 
in this case, as in the previous subsection, 90% of people felt discriminated because they are 
foreign. Another important remark is that 26% of them felt discriminated because of the way 
they spoke Italian. 
Table 17 illustrates how some main characteristics are distributed in two different subsamples: 
the one of migrants who have ever felt discriminated against and the one of those who have 
never experienced discrimination. It is interesting to notice that the mean education level and 
the employment condition are not statistically different in the two subsamples. Instead, most of 
the other variables considered appear to be different in a statistically significant way. This 
means that in the models that will be subsequently implemented, these factors need to be 
controlled for. 
As to the third subsection, it investigates whether migrants felt discriminated in their everyday 
life: in public places, in asking for a loan or for buying a house, or by their neighbours. 
Observations for all the individuals are available. The frequency of people feeling discriminated 
against in these contexts is quite low, as reported in Table 16. 
 The next section to be analysed is health: starting from eating habits to chronic health 
problems. Observations are available for all the individuals. As to eating habits, 54% of 
respondents eat both Italian and their Country typical food. Moreover, 25% smokes almost 
every day. To the question “How healthy do you feel?” only 13.956 people answered, because 
226 people refused to. 12% of all the observations is affected by chronic health problems (see 
Table 18). When asked whether they feel less productive at work possibly because of their 
depressive/anxious status, almost 4% of respondents refused to answer and only 6% of the 
responding individuals feel they are not as productive at work as they could be because of that. 
Only 0.21% of the sample went to psychiatric centres in the last three months.  
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Table 17-Summary statistics in subsamples based on perceived discrimination 
  
Never 
discriminated 
against 
Discriminated 
against 
T-test (p-value) 
Observations 10.057 4.087 (H0: mean1-mean2=0) 
% Older than 40 
0,5090 0,4896 
0,0365 
[0,4999] [0,4999] 
% Female 
0,5966 0,5195 
0,0000 
[0,4906] [0,4996] 
Education level (mean) 
2,4499 2,4521 
0,9119 
[1,0808] [1,0000] 
% Employed 
0,8927 0,8843 
0,1912 
[0,3095] [0,3199] 
Ability to read Italian 
(mean) 
3,0069 3,0952 
0,0000 
[0,9730] [0,9143] 
Ability to write in Italian 
(mean) 
2,8118 2,8268 
0,4554 
[0,9941] [0,9640] 
Ability to speak Italian 
(mean) 
3,3173 3,4803 
0,0000 
[0,8517] [0,7027] 
Ability to understand Italian 
(mean) 
3,3374 3,5011 
0,0000 
[0,8406] [0,6879] 
% Italian television 
language 
0,7680 0,7657 
0,7808 
[0,4221] [0,4236] 
% Italian TV news 
0,8605 0,8389 
0,0000 
[0,3752] [0,3374] 
% Police control at least 
once a month 
0,7905 0,7730 
0,0294 
[0,4069] [0,4189] 
% Police very or quite 
effective 
0,8255 0,7512 
0,0000 
[0,3795] [0,4323] 
Length of stay (mean) 
15,5657 16,6701 
0,0000 
[6,8981] [6,5179] 
Macro-area of residence 
(mean) 
2,1086 2,0726 
0,0317 
[0,9014] [0,9088] 
The variables whose values are not expressed as percentage are categorical ones: education level (0=no 
education, 5=tertiary education), Italian proficiency indices (1=not good at all, 4=very good). Length of stay is 
a discrete variable, going from a minimum of 5 yrs to a maximum of 74. Standard deviations in square brackets. 
 
Table 18 reports the mean values, as well as the minimum and the maximum, for three health 
measures that are going to be used in the following models. As it can be observed, migrants are 
on average quite healthy. 
The ISTAT dataset includes also an index of mental health for every respondent, which is 
distributed as displayed in Figure 2. The higher the value of the index and the better the 
respondent’s mental health. Figure 2 shows, through a vertical blue line, the median value of 
the mental health index, which is 55,9, and through a red line its mean value, which is 53,48. It 
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is to be noticed that the mean is lower than the median, hence the index of mental health 
distribution is negatively skewed. 
 
Table 18- Summary statistics of the main health indicators 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum value 
(not healthy 
at all) 
Maximum 
value 
(very healthy) 
Index of Mental Health 53,48 7,1484 7,6 69,4 
Perceived health status 4,11 0,7807 1 5 
Absence of Chronic health 
problems 
0,88 0,3273 0 1 
 
 
Figure 2-Distribution od Index of Mental Health in the sample 
 
 
Other interesting dimensions which are covered by the survey are migrants’ life satisfaction 
and happiness. Together with the mental health index, these measures convey information about 
migrants’ wellbeing, which could represent an important factor favouring integration. While all 
the observations are available for the variable indicating the level of life satisfaction, we can 
observe the happiness level of only 13.615: some observations are missing because respondents 
refused to answer. 
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The last section of interest is the one about integration. One way to measure integration 
is to observe migrants’ ability to master Italian language. Different aspects of Italian language 
can be investigated, such as oral production, oral comprehension as well as written production 
and comprehension. In order to analyse the sample, I considered only oral ability. As results in 
Table 19 show, most migrants can both speak and understand Italian very well. As a further 
measure of integration, the share of migrants speaking Italian at home is added: this percentage 
tells that less than half of the population in the sample, about 36%, speaks Italian at home. For 
this last variable considered observations are missing for those respondents who have no 
relatives in Italy. 
Another way to measure integration is to consider some migrants’ private behaviours. One of 
these may be the habit of watching Italian television. 13.177 people out of 14.182 usually watch 
TV, 76% of them usually watch Italian channels and 84% of them watch Italian TV news. 
However, only 44% read newspapers to get informed. A second way to measure integration is 
to analyse the degree of participation in Italian facts. Because of this reason, Table 20 contains 
the variables “Interest in Italian politics”, “Reading Italian newspapers”, “Watching Italian TV 
news”, “Television language” and “Going to the cinema”. Only 37% of respondents are 
interested in Italian politics, but 94% of the migrants who usually read newspapers read Italian 
ones. For this last variable the 7.928 missing observations refer to those respondents who do 
not use to read any newspaper. 
 
Table 19-Ability to master Italian language (sample distribution) 
 
N % 
Ability to speak Italian   
Not good at all 574 4,05 
Not good 1.386 9,77 
Quite good 4.569 32,22 
Very good 7.653 53,96 
Total 14.182 100 
Ability to understand Italian   
Not good at all 533 3,76 
Not good 1.334 9,41 
Quite good 4.505 31,77 
Very good 7.810 55,07 
Total 14.182 100 
Language spoken with family   
Other language 8.447 64,41 
Italian 4.668 35,59 
Total 13.115 100 
 
31 
 
Table 20-Indicators of social integration (sample distribution) 
 N % 
Interest in Italian politics   
No 8.838 62,32 
Yes 5.344 37,68 
Total 14.182 100 
Reading Italian newspapers   
No 367 5,87 
Yes 5.887 94,13 
Total 6.254 100 
Watching Italian TV news   
No 2.097 15,91 
Yes 11.080 84,09 
Total 13.177 100 
Television language   
Italian 3.075 23,34 
Other 10.102 76,66 
Total 13.177 100 
Going to the cinema   
Never 12.982 91,54 
At least once a year 1.200 8,46 
Total 14.182 100 
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4. Empirical strategy 
 
The final aim of this empirical analysis is to assess whether discrimination against immigrants 
has any effect on different dimensions of immigrants’ life, namely with health, employment 
status and socio-cultural integration.  
 
4.1 An instrumental variable approach 
In the first model, I proceeded to analyse the impact that immigrants’ perceived discrimination 
has on immigrants’ health. Estimating this relationship through simple OLS would lead to 
biased and inconsistent coefficient because of reverse causality. In fact, on one hand it is 
intuitive to think that migrants who have ever felt discriminated against are more likely to suffer 
from health problems, particularly from mental health disturbs, but on the other hand also the 
opposite could be true, that is people affected by health problems may be more likely to be 
targeted. Hence, in order to tackle reverse causality, I chose to implement an instrumental 
variable strategy. To find suitable instruments for perceived discrimination was hard, but this 
work, which represents a first attempt to an IV estimation, suggests two instrumental variables. 
The instruments selected are ‘verbal insults’ and ‘threats and assaults’. In other words, three 
different measures of health, mental health, perceived health status and absence of chronic 
health problems, are regressed on the exogenous variations in the discrimination perception due 
to insults and threats received.  
 ‘Verbal insults’ and ‘threats and assaults’ are assumed to be strongly correlated with 
perceived discrimination: migrants who experienced this kind of offense are clearly more likely 
to feel discriminated against in the host society, it could be said that they are more sensitive to 
discrimination. This assumption is confirmed by the F-statistics presented at the bottom of each 
table, which are all above the conventional threshold of 10. 
The regressions that are going to be presented are just a first step towards causality. In 
fact, the assumption of exogeneity of the instruments may be criticized: there may be some 
reverse causality between the instruments and the dependent variable, or some omitted variables 
may correlate with both the instruments and the dependent variable. 
Firstly, as to reverse causality: migrants in bad health conditions may be more likely to 
be insulted or threatened. However, even if this is possible, it is unlikely. Moreover, migrants 
in the sample at hand are not so unhealthy to trigger insults and threats (see Table 17). 
Secondly, as to omitted variables, it could be argued that there may be some omitted 
factors which correlate both with health and with the probability to be insulted or threatened 
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and aggressed. For instance, it could be argued that immigrants living in wealthy 
neighbourhoods, where living standards are high, are more likely to be healthy (e.g. because of 
lower levels of stress) and, at the same time, less likely to be offended, because in those areas 
people are more educated or police is more effective. In the ISTAT survey data, no information 
was provided about individual income, which would have been a good control for living 
standards, though I tackled the above problem by controlling for police controls’ frequency and 
effectiveness. These two variables can be considered proxies of individual income levels and 
of the quality of the residence neighbourhood, since usually in wealthier residence areas police 
controls are more frequent and effective. Moreover, in the instrumental variable regression it is 
controlled for migrants’ smoking and drinking habits, and for their BMI (Body Mass Index), 
which are factors affecting both health status and the probability to get insulted or aggressed. 
For instance, migrants who are used to drinking a lot are more likely to be targeted by natives. 
Hence, once it is controlled for these variables, being insulted or aggressed is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the dependent variable health, it is assumed to be random. 
The same rationales explained so far hold for the third model, estimating the association 
between perceived discrimination, always instrumented with insults and threats, and social 
integration. In this model too, once that the controls are included in the regression to tackle 
reverse causality between the instruments and the dependent variable, it can be assumed that 
threats and insults are associated with integration only through discrimination.  
Also to estimate the second model, which focuses on the association between 
immigrants’ health and their employment status, I opted for an instrumental variable strategy. 
In this second model the reverse causality between health and employment status is more 
straightforward than in the previous case. Indeed, healthier people are more likely to be 
employed, as well as employed individuals have more chances to be in a better health status. 
This last proposition is meaningful particularly if it is thought of psychological health: 
employed people may be more satisfied with their lives and experience lower levels of stress 
and frustration. Once again, this reverse causality bias is tackled by using verbal insults and 
threats received as instruments. It is to be noticed that the first stage equation of this second 
model is just the reduced form of the previous model, because the dependent variable of the 
first model, health, which is now the endogenous regressor, is directly regressed on the 
instruments, ‘verbal insults’ and ‘threats and assaults’. 
As to the validity of these instruments, it could be argued that they are correlated with 
the error term in the structural equation, because there may be some factors influencing both 
the probability to be offended or aggressed and the chances to be employed. For example, it 
could be argued that migrants living in wealthier neighbourhoods are less likely to be 
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unemployed as well as to be offended, because natives living in those areas are more educated 
or because migrants can develop better social networks which help them find a job. Like in the 
previous “discrimination-health” model, this omitted variable bias is tackled by controlling for 
police controls’ frequency and effectiveness. Other important characteristics which may 
correlate with both employment status and offences are controlled for: the ability to master 
Italian language, as well as unhealthy habits (e.g. consuming alcohol away from meals). 
Furthermore, there may be reverse causality bias between offenses and employment 
status. In fact, people who have ever been insulted or aggressed may be discouraged, or 
humiliated, hence they may be less likely to be employed; at the same time, though, migrants’ 
employment status may affect their chances to be targeted. However, this last option is quite 
unlikely, because employment status is unobservable: from the outside it cannot be told whether 
a migrant is employed or unemployed. However, there may be some individual unobservable 
characteristics, such as personal appearance, which can affect both the probability of being 
employed and of being offended. In order to control for these unobservable features, I included 
in the regression a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has ever worked in Italy. 
In this way, it can be distinguished between those migrants who have never worked in Italy, 
perhaps because of some personal characteristics which make them not suitable to work, and 
those who have the good characteristics to get a job, but are currently not working. 
Also in this second model it is assumed that, once all the controls mentioned are included in the 
regression, ‘verbal insults’ and ‘threats’ are random. 
 
4.2 Controls 
The controls included in the regressions are many, since the ISTAT survey provided a lot of 
information about respondents. All the controls are categorical variables, which are inserted in 
the regression as dummies for each single value. The various controls can be aggregated into 
five different sets: sociodemographic, cultural, lingual features, health determinants, 
information about residence location and employment information. In the first group of controls 
information about age, gender, marital status, education level, length of stay in Italy measured 
in years, and the BMI (Body Mass Index) is included. Cultural features concern respondents’ 
religion and their Continent of origin; more detailed information about origins could not be 
used because, due to privacy reasons, more specific information, like Country of birth, was 
provided only in aggregated form in the dataset. The third set of controls consists of indicators 
measuring immigrants’ ability to master Italian language: it includes categorical variables 
measuring Italian proficiency in writing, speaking, understanding and reading. It was important 
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to include this kind of controls because Italian language proficiency affects the likelihood to 
find an employment, as well as the probability to be discriminated against: people speaking a 
bad Italian are intuitively less likely to find a job and they could object of discrimination more 
easily. Health determinants include smoking and drinking habits of the respondents, which are 
well-known to be harmful for health. The first control is a categorical variable indicating 
whether the individual used to smoke in the past, still smokes or has never smoked. Variables 
concerning drinking habits instead consider how frequently the respondents are used to drinking 
beer, wine and fizzy drinks. Finally, the last group of controls deals with residence information. 
Also in this case, ISTAT dataset does not provide very specific information because of privacy 
reasons. That is why no information was available about the specific province, or region, where 
the immigrants are currently living. The most precise and recent indicator that I was able to 
create was about the penultimate province or region where the respondent lived, but such an 
indicator was available just for few observations. Hence, the variables that I included in the 
residence controls are the size of the residence municipality, distinguishing among metropolitan 
municipalities (Turin, Milan, Venice, Genoa, Bologna, Florence, Verona, Rome, Naples, Bari, 
Palermo, Catania and Cagliari) and those with more or less than 10.000 inhabitants, and macro-
area of residence, indicating whether respondents live in Northern, Central or Southern (Isles 
included) Italy. As to the previous distinctions, Northern Italy includes Piemonte, Valle 
d’Aosta, Lombardy, Liguria, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Emilia 
Romagna, Centre includes Tuscany, Umbria, Marche and Lazio, Southern and Isles is 
composed of Campania, Basilicata, Calabria, Abruzzo, Molise, Puglia, Sicily and Sardinia. 
Moreover, trying to add as more information about residence location as possible, two further 
controls used are the frequency of police controls in the residence area and the effectiveness of 
such controls. The idea is that these indicators tell, to some extent, how safe a neighbourhood 
is: the more effective the police is and the lower the criminality rate is expected to be, as well 
as the more frequent the police controls are and the lower the criminality rate is likely to be. 
Both ‘police controls’ frequency’ and ‘police effectiveness’ are categorical variables, 
representing the answers to the following questions, respectively: “In your opinion, how often 
does the police passes in the road where you live, both on foot and by car?” and “All things 
considered, do you think that the police manage to control criminality in the area where you 
live?”. 
A further control, indicating whether immigrants have ever worked in Italy, is included 
in the second model. The reason why this variable was added is to control for some migrants’ 
characteristics which may prevent them from finding a job and at the same time affect 
discrimination likelihood. 
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4.3 Weights 
One of the most important controls is macro-area of residence, because it conveys information 
not only about residence, but also about economic background, since Northern regions have 
higher GDP per capita than Southern ones (in 2012 ISTAT reported that in the South real GDP 
per capita was 43.2% lower than in the North-Centre Italy). Observations related to the South 
and Isles are oversampled with respect to the other macro-areas, despite the distribution of 
foreign residents in Italy is much more concentrated in the North and in the Centre. This 
resulting sample is explained by the sampling strategy that ISTAT used (“Condizione e 
Integrazione Sociale dei Cittadini Stranieri-Aspetti Metodologici dell’Indagine”, 2016). ISTAT 
chose to select data through stratified sampling, divided into two different selection stages: the 
first one concerning the sampling of municipalities with a minimum number of foreign citizens 
residents and the second one selecting from each municipalities’ stratum a certain number of 
households. The households sampled were allocated to six different geographical areas (North-
East, North-West, Centre, South-East, South-West and Isles) through an allocation strategy 
which combined both proportional and uniform allocation. The latter, consisting of selecting a 
number of households from each stratum so to maintain the same proportion as in the 
population, was given a weight of 0.2 in the allocation strategy. On the other hand, the uniform 
allocation was attributed a greater weight, 0.8. Uniform allocation consists of selecting a certain 
number of households from each municipalities stratum regardless of those strata weight in the 
whole population. This method favours strata that have less weight in the population, in this 
case Southern Italy and Isles, by affording them the same level of importance as the more 
relevant strata. This reduces the global effectiveness of the sample, but it allows to make 
estimates at macro-area level with greater precision, which is exactly why uniform allocation 
was chosen.  
Drawing estimates on the whole sample using such an unbalanced sample would lead 
to results whose external validity is poor, precisely because the sample does not reflect the 
distribution of the actual immigrants’ population in Italy. Therefore, in order to face the 
oversample problem, all the regressions that are estimated in the next sections are weighted. 
Weights used are already included in the dataset. These weights are constructed through a 
procedure based on the so-called calibration estimators. They are basically constructed starting 
from direct weights, that are the inverse of the probability of being included in the sample, then 
they are corrected by the number of missing answers and, at the end, final weights are 
determined through a problem of constrained optimization, where the constraints are equality 
conditions between some sample estimates and some known values, deduced from external 
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sources (ISTAT, “Condizione e Integrazione Sociale dei Cittadini Stranieri-Aspetti 
metodologici dell’indagine”, 2016). 
 
4.4 Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
As already explained, in estimating the different models, two variables are identified to 
instrument the endogenous regressors: verbal insults and as threats or assaults suffered. It is 
precisely because of overidentification and robust standard errors, which are used since in linear 
probabilities models the errors are heteroskedastic, that I chose to estimate the model through 
the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) rather than through two-stage least squares 
(2SLS). Anyway, the 2SLS estimator is just a special case of the more general GMM estimator. 
The starting assumption to obtain both estimators is the exogeneity of the instruments: 
instrumental variables Zi must be uncorrelated with the error terms ui, that is 𝐸(𝒁𝑖𝑢𝑖) = 𝟎. The 
same relation can be rewritten as: 
 𝐸{𝑍𝑖(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖?̂?)} = 𝐸{𝑔𝑖(𝛽)} , (1) 
where gi is a set of moment conditions Lx1, being L the number of instruments. The exogeneity 
of the instruments means that there are L moment conditions that will be satisfied at the true 
value of β: 
 𝐸{𝑔𝑖(𝛽)} = 0 . (2) 
The intuition behind GMM is to choose an estimator of β to solve ?̅?(?̂?) = 0, where ?̅?(?̂?) is the 
sample analog of 𝑔𝑖(𝛽). 
If the number of instruments L is exactly the number of endogenous regressors K, then 
we have as many equations, the L moments conditions, as we do unknowns, the K coefficients 
in ?̂?. In this case of exact identification, it is possible to find ?̂? that solves ?̅?(?̂?) = 0 and the 
GMM estimator boils down to the 2SLS estimator (C.F. Baum et al., 2003). 
If, instead, the number of instruments is higher than the number of endogenous variables, L>K, 
we have an overidentification case and it is not possible to find a ?̂? that sets all the moment 
conditions to zero, because there are more equations than unknowns in the system. Hence, an 
L×L weighting matrix is used to construct a quadratic form in the moment condition. This way 
we obtain the GMM objective function 𝐽(?̂?): 
 𝐽(?̂?) = 𝑛?̅?(?̂?)′𝑊?̅?(?̂?). (3) 
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?̂? is found by minimising the above function; the GMM estimator is obtained by putting to zero 
the first order derivative of the function 𝐽(?̂?), obtaining the following formula: 
 𝛽𝐺𝑀𝑀 = (𝑋′𝑍𝑊𝑍′𝑋)
−1𝑋′𝑍𝑊𝑍′𝑦 . (4) 
The optimal weighting matrix to be chosen is the inverse of the covariance matrix of the 
moment conditions S, where S is: 
 𝑆 =
1
𝑛
𝐸(𝑍′𝑢𝑢′𝑍) =
1
𝑛
𝐸(𝑍′Ω𝑍) (5) 
Hence: 
 𝛽𝐺𝑀𝑀 = (𝑋′𝑍𝑆
−1𝑍′𝑋)−1𝑋′𝑍𝑆−1𝑍′𝑦 . (6) 
The 2SLS estimator is a special case of GMM estimator if the more restrictive assumption of 
homoskedasticity of the errors is made, that is if it is assumed that Ω = 𝜎2𝐼. 
The standard IV estimates are consistent even in presence of heteroskedasticity, but the 
conventional IV estimates of the standard errors are inconsistent, preventing valid inference. 
Therefore, albeit the conventional IV estimator is consistent even in presence of heteroskedastic 
errors, it is inefficient. The usual approach today when facing heteroskedasticity of unknown 
form is to use the generalized method of moments (GMM), introduced by Hansen in 1982 (C.F. 
Baum et al., 2003). 
In the models that are going to be presented in this thesis, GMM is used precisely 
because estimating weighted regressions implies assuming robust standard errors. 
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5. Main findings 
 
5.1 The factors associated with life satisfaction 
As already pointed out, one of the original aspects of this thesis is that it uses data describing 
migrants’ own approach and perceptions of the host society in which they live. This enabled to 
conduct a study focused on analysing what is the impact that natives’ attitude has on migrants’ 
life, which is something new relative to most of the existing studies examining the determinants 
of natives’ behaviours towards migrants. 
This first paragraph presents what are the factors that positively or negatively affect 
migrants’ life satisfaction. This first passage highlights some important correlations among the 
variables which will be used to implement the different models in the following sections. 
Two dependent variables, life satisfaction and loneliness, are regressed on multiple 
covariates using a weighted least squares model. The weights used were already included in the 
ISTAT dataset and their aim is to balance our sample, in which migrants living in Southern 
Italy are overrepresented. Loneliness, beside life satisfaction, was chosen as a dependent 
variable because it gives a taste of how migrants perceive their lives and how they are happy 
and satisfied with living in Italy. This variable represents the answer to the following survey 
question: “Do you feel lonely here in Italy?” and takes the form of a binary variable, equal to 
one if the answers were “very lonely” or “quite lonely” and to zero if the respondent said “not 
very lonely” or “not lonely at all”. As far as life satisfaction is concerned, it is measured through 
a dummy variable too. People could assess their own level of satisfaction through a scale from 
zero (not satisfied at all) to ten (very satisfied); those respondents whose score was above the 
sample average (7,56) were attributed the value one, those whose score was below the mean 
had the value zero. This is how the binary variable ‘life satisfaction’ was constructed. 
Many controls are included in the regression: sociodemographic, cultural and lingual 
features, health status information, such as perceived health status, mental health and BMI 
(Body Mass Index), information about the length of stay in Italy, about the residence location 
and, finally, information about employment status and occupation. However, the covariates I 
want to bring attention to are all the variables measuring discrimination. Different kinds of 
discrimination are considered. First of all, discrimination the individual can experience in 
different places of everyday life, like at work, in the hospitals, in public offices, or in the 
residence neighbourhood by the neighbours themselves. Secondly a more ‘random’, we could 
say, type of discrimination is taken into consideration, that is discrimination that may take place 
in the roads, not connected with any specific activity or institution, but just related to racial 
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hatred and sourced from aesthetic and cultural differences. This kind of discrimination is 
measured through ‘verbal insults’ and ‘threats and assaults’. These variables correspond to the 
survey questions asking, respectively:” In Italy, have you ever been insulted, humiliated or 
offended in such a wat that made you feel hurt?” and “In Italy have you ever been threatened 
or physically aggressed by known or unknown people, in a way that really scared you?”. These 
variables, as well as all the covariates concerning discrimination, are measured by dummies, 
taking value one if the migrant has ever been discriminated against and zero otherwise. 
Table 21-Weighted Least Squares Regression of the Factors Associated with Life Satisfaction and 
Loneliness 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent variables Life satisfaction Loneliness 
    
Discrimination at work -0.053*** 0.051*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) 
Discrimination in the residence neighbourhood -0.023 0.030 
 (0.024) (0.025) 
Discrimination in the Health Care system -0.014 0.064* 
 (0.032) (0.034) 
Discrimination in public offices -0.042* 0.0038 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
Threats/assaults -0.061* -0.032 
 (0.032) (0.029) 
Verbal insults 0.0022 0.062*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) 
Gender (1=female) 0.037*** 0.0071 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Married 0.061*** -0.097*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
Employment status (base level: dependent employee)   
Collaboration -0.16*** -0.029 
 (0.049) (0.042) 
Self-employed -0.040* -0.036** 
 (0.022) (0.017) 
Unemployed -0.13*** 0.090*** 
 (0.044) (0.034) 
Inactive -0.028 0.055* 
 (0.042) (0.033) 
Index of Mental Health 0.13*** -0.11*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
Perceived Health Status  0.11*** -0.078*** 
 (0.017) (0.017)    
Observations 9,436 9,436 
R-squared 0.122 0.121 
The model is estimated through weighted least squares. The dependent variables are equal to one if, respectively, 
respondents’ valuation of their life satisfaction, from 1 to 10, was above the sample average and if they defined 
themselves “very lonely” or “quite lonely”. Also the covariates of interest are binary: they take value one if the 
respondent has ever felt discriminated against in the various contexts (hospitals, public offices, workplace). All the 
controls are dummies or factor variables. Only part of the controls is displayed in the table. All the controls include: 
sociodemographic (gender, age, education level, BMI, length of stay in Italy), cultural (religion, Continent of origin), 
lingual (ability to speak, understand, read and write in Italian) features, information about residence (size of the 
municipality, macro-area (North, Centre, South and Isles), frequency of police controls and degree of police 
effectiveness), employment status information and dummies concerning the specific occupation, information about 
smoking and drinking habits. Robust standard errors are displayed in brackets (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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The observations used in this regression are less than 14.182 because some of the variables 
included have some missing values, as displayed in Table 8 in the third Section. In particular, 
‘discrimination at work’ is available only for 11.704 observations and religion information, 
included in the cultural controls, is missing for 468 individuals. These values are missing simply 
because the respondents refused to answer to these questions. 
It is important to make clear that the results presented in Table 21 represent simple 
correlations and not causal relationships between the variables. In fact, the exogeneity of the 
explanatory variables of interest, discrimination, cannot be guaranteed by implementing a 
weighted least squares model. The estimates generated by this model, indeed, may be subject 
to an omitted variable bias: despite as many controls as possible were included in the regression, 
some controls are unobservable, like being optimistic, or simply they were not provided in the 
dataset, such as household income, which certainly affects the level of individual life 
satisfaction. 
Results concerning the estimated coefficients relative to the controls are in line with the 
findings of the previous studies about life satisfaction. In fact, it results that women are more 
satisfied with their lives than men, that married people are happier and less lonely and, finally, 
unemployment negatively affects life satisfaction and favours loneliness. Furthermore, as it was 
predictable, a higher index of mental health, indicating a better mental health status and a better 
perceived health status positively contribute to life satisfaction and make it less likely to feel 
lonely.  Some other controls were included in the regression, but they were not reported in the 
table because they were not statistically significant, or because they were not of interest. For 
example, a higher BMI (Body Mass Index), corresponding to overweight or obese people, make 
people feel lonelier and its estimated coefficient is highly statistically significant. Also, even 
though contrary to what could be expected, education level is one of the controls, but it emerged 
that higher education level has no statistically significant impact nor on life satisfaction neither 
on loneliness. 
As to discrimination covariates, even though not all the different discrimination 
measures have a significant impact on the two dependent variables, all the estimated 
coefficients have the expected sign. In fact, discrimination is negatively associated with life 
satisfaction and positively contributes to loneliness. It is interesting to notice that discrimination 
at work is the only covariate that is significant at a 1% significance level in both regressions: 
being discriminated against at work implies a higher level of dissatisfaction and loneliness. 
Loneliness is positively correlated with discrimination at work, as already said, and with 
discrimination in the health care system and verbal insults. On the other hand, life satisfaction 
has a negative correlation with discrimination at work, in the public offices and threats and 
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assaults. Particularly, migrants who have ever been threatened or aggressed are almost 8% less 
likely to define themselves satisfied with their lives and those who have been insulted or 
offended have 8% probability more to feel lonely with respect to those who have never been 
discriminated against. 
These findings are in line with those obtained in a study conducted in 2011 by the 
sociologist M. Safi, who found out that discrimination is a major determinant in explaining 
migrants’ lower life satisfaction with respect to natives. As it is reported in this study, it is not 
just the migration phenomenon itself that explains immigrants’ subjective despair, but rather 
the hostility they may experience in everyday life in the host Country. 
These preliminary results already give an idea of the real impact that discrimination has 
on immigrants. Discrimination is not just something “culturally wrong or unfair”, but it has 
statistically significant consequences on migrants’ life and behaviours. In the following 
sections, the new findings will point out that the impact of discrimination establishes concrete 
barrier in the process of integration and accounts for a psychological, but also physical, cost in 
immigrants’ well-being.  
 
5.2 The association between perceived discrimination and health 
The aim of the present paragraph is to show what is the association between discrimination and 
health, exploiting the variations in discrimination perception deriving from being offended or 
harassed. 
The literature shows that health gaps between migrants and natives exist in many 
developed Countries. The most common explanations to this phenomenon concern the lower 
socioeconomic status of immigrants, hence different health inputs and lower quality hospitals, 
or their lower ability to purchase medications and medical procedures. Yet, another potentially 
important determinant of racial and ethnic health gaps is discrimination (D.W. Johnston, G. 
Lordan, 2011). 
On the basis of a concept developed by the WHO (World Health Organisation) in the 
Ottawa Charter (1986) and of a definition given by the scientific magazine “The Lancet”, health 
can be defined as the capability to manage conditions of illness or of well-being by adapting to 
the external environment and using one’s own resources, so to satisfy individual and social 
needs. Using economic terms, health has value, because, even though it has no exchange value, 
it positively influences individual utility, interpreted as the satisfaction of one’s needs. 
According to the Grossman model (1972), health can be seen both as a consumption and as an 
investment good. It can be defined a consumption good, because, as already mentioned, it 
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positively affects individual utility, exactly like any other consumption good. However, it can 
be defined an investment good because it preserves or increases the level of individual human 
capital, thus making individuals productive and able to get some income, which is one of the 
factors that “produce” health in turn. Health is an outcome determined by various inputs, which 
are more or less manageable by the policymaker. These inputs include: the health care system, 
individual behaviours, socio-economic factors and environmental and genetic conditions. The 
latter aspects are indirectly influenced by education and income level. 
What this paragraph wants to show is that, when referring to an immigrants’ population, 
a further indirect factor affecting the environmental conditions in which migrants live exists: 
discrimination. The analyses that follow will show that perceived discrimination is associated 
not only with lower values of the mental health index, or of perceived health status, but also 
with the incidence of chronic health problems. The association between perceived 
discrimination and health is estimated though two different models: a weighted least squares 
model, to point out interesting correlations among the variables, and a generalized method of 
moments (GMM) model, which gets closer to a causal interpretation of the coefficients, since 
instruments are used to tackle reverse causality bias. 
The first results are presented in Table 22, which reports the estimates obtained by 
running a weighted least squares model of three different health indicators on ‘perceived 
discrimination’.  
The dependent variables chosen are: index of mental health, perceived health status and 
chronic health problems. All of them are binary variables. Mental health is measured through 
the 12-item version of the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) contained in the ISTAT 
questionnaire. The GHQ is a commonly used self-reported measure of mental health and 
consists of questions regarding the respondent’s emotional and behavioural health over the past 
few weeks. The twelve items in the GHQ are: ability to concentrate, sleep loss due to worry, 
perception of role, capability in decision making, whether constantly under strain, problems in 
overcoming difficulties, enjoyment of day-to-day activities, ability to face problems, whether 
unhappy or depressed, loss of confidence, self-worth, and general happiness (D. W. Johnston, 
G. Lordan, 2011). The higher the score obtained in the GHQ and the better the mental health 
status of the respondent. In the following model, the index of mental health was turned into a 
binary indicator by attributing the value one to all the individuals whose score was above the 
sample average of 53,8 (see Figure 2) and the value zero to all those below this average. 
As fare as ‘perceived health status’ is concerned, it is the answer to the survey question:” 
How healthy do you feel in general?”. Respondents could answer using a scale from one (very 
healthy) to five (not healthy at all), but I turned also this categorical variable into a dummy by 
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assigning the value one to all the respondents who declared a health status above the sample 
average, corresponding to a score of 1,89, and zero otherwise. 
Finally, the third binary variable is ‘absence of chronic health problems’. It takes value 
one if the respondent is not affected by chronic problems and zero if she/he is. 
The covariate of interest is perceived discrimination, measured as a dummy, taking value one 
if the individual has ever felt discriminated against and zero otherwise. It was constructed 
exploiting the information about discrimination in different contexts provided by the ISTAT 
survey. The variable ‘perceived discrimination’, thus, takes value one if the respondent has ever 
been discriminated against, since her/his arrival in Italy, in any of these contexts: at the 
workplace, while searching for a job, in public offices, in search of a house, in buying a car 
insurance, in the hospitals, in the residence neighbourhood. It is important to highlight that the 
variable at hand indicates perceived discrimination, not discrimination tout court, because 
measuring discrimination represents an empirical difficulty. In fact, perceived discrimination 
may not correspond to true discrimination, since it is a subjective perception, thus it can be 
measured with error.  
The controls included in the model below are: sociodemographic, cultural, lingual 
features and residence information. In addition, controls concerning smoking and drinking 
habits, already described in Section 4, were added, since they are obviously correlated with 
health outcomes. Not all these controls, but only the ones whose estimated coefficients were 
considered interesting are included in Table 21. No employment information is included in the 
controls’ set because it would represent a bad control, that is it may be considered as an outcome 
variable itself, thus it could bias the estimates. Moreover, as Table 17 points out, employment 
status does not statistically differ between migrants who have perceived discrimination and 
those who have not, so it is not needed to include it among the controls. 
In this first weighted least squares model, due to potential reverse causality, the 
estimated coefficients, presented in Table 22, do not point out any causal relationship between 
the variables, but just simple correlations.  
Starting from observing the correlations among the controls and health, it can be noticed 
that, as it was expected, overweight and obese people are more likely to report a lower perceived 
health level and a higher number of chronic problems than normal weight people. It is also 
interesting to observe that married people report better mental and perceived health. A further 
interesting aspect is that people who used to smoke in the past are more likely to be affected by 
chronic health problems at present, while people who currently smoke have a lower index of 
mental health, on average, and report worse perceived health status. Moreover, people who 
define police more effective in the area where they live have higher mental health indices. This 
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could mean that police high effectiveness makes people feel safer and less stressed, though this 
cannot be affirmed because this coefficient may be biased: migrants living in a wealthier 
neighbourhood are more likely to be in a better health status and also to benefit from higher 
police effectiveness. 
 
Table 22- Weighted Least Squares Regression of the Association between Discrimination and Health 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variables 
Index of 
Mental 
Health 
Perceived 
Health 
Status 
Absence of 
chronic 
problems 
        
Perceived discrimination -0.14*** -0.087*** -0.074*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.0098) 
Gender (1=female) -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.033*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) 
Married 0.047*** 0.016* -0.0044 
 (0.013) (0.0091) (0.0087) 
BMI (base level: normal weight)    
Underweight 0.043 0.023 0.028 
 (0.035) (0.021) (0.019) 
Overweight -0.0034 -0.016 -0.026*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.0096) 
Obese -0.0013 -0.086*** -0.072*** 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) 
Smoking habits (base level: never smoked)    
Smoked in the past -0.0032 -0.0086 -0.041*** 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) 
Smoking at present -0.044*** -0.015 -0.0054 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) 
Alcohol consumption away from meals (base level: never)    
Everyday -0.24*** -0.082 -0.15* 
 (0.086) (0.078) (0.085) 
Sometimes in a week -0.089** 0.014 -0.0068 
 (0.037) (0.019) (0.019) 
More rarely -0.048*** 0.0099 -0.0017 
 (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) 
Police effectiveness (base level: not effective at all)    
Not very effective 0.044 0.031 0.018 
 (0.037) (0.030) (0.026) 
Quite effective 0.066* 0.037 0.039 
 (0.034) (0.028) (0.023) 
 0.13*** 0.053* 0.028 
Very effective (0.035) (0.029) (0.024)     
Observations 11,960 11,865 11,840 
R-squared 0.075 0.117 0.107 
The model is estimated through weighted least squares. The dependent variables are equal to one if, 
respectively, the index of mental health is higher than the sample average, if the perceived health is very good 
or good and if the individual has no chronic health problems. Also the covariates of interest are binary: they take 
value one if the respondent has ever felt discriminated against in the various contexts (hospitals, public offices, 
workplace). All the controls are dummies or factor variables. Only part of the controls is displayed in the table. 
All the controls include: sociodemographic (gender, age, education level, BMI, length of stay in Italy), cultural 
(religion, Continent of origin), lingual (ability to speak, understand, read and write in Italian) features, 
information about residence (size of the municipality, macro-area (North, Centre, South and Isles), frequency of 
police controls and degree of police effectiveness), information about smoking and drinking habits. Robust 
standard errors are displayed in brackets (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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As far as the covariate of interest is concerned, discrimination, it results that it is negatively 
correlated with all the three outcomes and in all the cases it is statistically significant: at a 1% 
significance level. It is interesting that discrimination correlates not only with mental health, 
which was predictable, but also with the incidence of chronic health problems: migrants being 
discriminated against are also those people who report chronic health problems. 
 However, these results represent simple correlations, as already said, because reverse 
causality and omitted variable bias makes these weighted least-squares estimates biased and 
inconsistent. Hence, to get closer to causality, the same association between the variables is 
estimated using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and selecting ‘verbal insults’ and 
‘threats and assaults’ as instruments. They are assumed to be valid and informative for the 
reasons explained in Section 4. Being the number of instruments higher than the number of 
endogenous variables, this is an overidentified model, which allows to conduct a Hansen’s test 
to verify the validity of the selected instruments. The p-value of this test, whose null hypothesis 
assumes all instruments are valid, is shown in the bottom lines of the following table. 
The controls included in this model, even if not displayed in the above table, are the same used 
in the weighted least squares model. 
It is to be observed that the number of observations is lower than 14.182, the whole 
sample, in all the three regressions. This is due to the fact that some observations are missing 
for some of the variables included in the regressions, simply because the respondents refused 
to answer certain survey questions. Particularly, for the dependent variables ‘perceived health 
status’ and ‘absence of chronic problems’ respectively 13.956 and 13.878 observations are 
available. The number of the missing values for the other variables used in the regressions are 
displayed in Table 8 in Section 3. 
Table 23 illustrates the estimated coefficients of the first and second stage equations, 
distinguishing between the three different variables used to measure health: index of mental 
health, perceived health status and chronic health problems. Another distinction that is made in 
the table is the one between columns 1 and 2 and columns 3 and 4. In fact, the first two columns 
report the estimates using a weighted model, while the last columns show the estimates of a 
model without weights. As it can be observed, the estimates are qualitatively the same, but they 
are slightly different in quantitative terms. As to the index of mental health, for example, the 
second stage coefficient in the model without weights is slightly lower in absolute value. This 
means that for the observations of the Southern subsample, the correlation between perceived 
discrimination and health is weaker: once weights are added to the model in order to balance 
the sample, to attribute lower weight to the oversampled Southern observations, the estimated 
coefficient increase in absolute value. 
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Table 23-Instrumental Variable Regression of the Association between Discrimination against Immigrants and 
Immigrants’ Health 
  WEIGTHED NOT WEIGHTED 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Dependent variable (1) 
Perceived 
discrimination 
Index of Mental 
Health 
Perceived 
discrimination 
Index of Mental 
Health 
          
Verbal insults 0.46***   0.48***  
 (0.018)   (0.013)  
Threats and assaults 0.18***   0.18***  
 (0.027)   (0.021)  
Perceived discrimination  -0.25***  -0.19*** 
  (0.056)  (0.042) 
      
Observations 11,960 11,960 11,960 11,96 
R-squared 0.204   0.212  
IV F-stat  525,104  975,099 
Hansen's J test (p-value)         
Dependent variable (2) 
Perceived 
discrimination 
Perceived 
Health Status 
Perceived 
discrimination 
Perceived 
Health Status 
          
Verbal insults 0.46***   0.48***  
 (0.018)   (0.013)  
Threats and assaults 0.18***   0.18***  
 (0.027)   (0.021)  
Perceived discrimination  -0.15***  -0.14*** 
  (0.045)  (0.034) 
      
Observations 11,865 11,865 11,865 11,865 
R-squared 0.204   0.213  
IV F-stat  519,903  975,49 
Hansen's J test (p-value)         
Dependent variable (3) 
Perceived 
discrimination 
Absence of 
chronic 
problems 
Perceived 
discrimination 
Absence of 
chronic 
problems 
          
Verbal insults 0.46***   0.48***  
 (0.018)   (0.013)  
Threats and assaults 0.18***   0.18***  
 (0.027)   (0.021)  
Perceived discrimination  -0.16***  -0.12*** 
  (0.042)  (0.031) 
      
Observations 11,840 11,840 11,840 11,840 
R-squared 0.204   0.213 0.080 
IV F-stat  518,444  972,57 
Hansen's J test (p-value)         
The dependent variables are equal to one if, respectively, the index of mental health is higher than the sample 
average, if the perceived health is very good or good and if the individual has no chronic health problems. Also the 
endogenous variable is binary, it takes value one if the respondent has ever felt discriminated against in various 
contexts (hospitals, public offices, workplace). The instruments are dummies too, taking value one if the individual 
has ever been insulted or threatened. The controls included in the regression but not displayed in the table are: 
sociodemographic (gender, age, education level, BMI, length of stay in Italy), cultural (religion, Continent of origin), 
lingual (ability to speak, understand, read and write in Italian) information, information about residence (size of the 
municipality, macro-area (North, Centre, South and Isles), frequency of police controls and degree of police 
effectiveness, information about smoking and drinking habits. Robust standard errors are displayed in brackets (*** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Table 23 reports positive and statistically significant coefficients for the first stage equations. 
This means that migrants who have ever been offended or harassed are those migrants who 
perceive stronger discrimination. Both instruments have estimated coefficients which are highly 
statistically significant, all at a 1% significance level. Moreover, they appear to be strongly 
correlated with perceived discrimination, since the F-statistics reported at the bottom of the 
table are far above the conventional threshold of 10. In addition, as far as instruments validity 
is concerned, the p-values of the Hansen’s test lead to accept the null hypothesis that 
instruments are valid. 
As to the second stage estimates, they have the same signs as in the weighted least 
squares model in Table 22. Even isolating discrimination variations due to insults and threats 
there appears to be a statistically significant correlation between perceived discrimination and 
health. Moreover, this association is strong, especially when considering mental health, since 
the model estimates that migrants who perceive they have been discriminated against are 25% 
less likely to obtain a mental health index higher than the average of the sample. The same share 
is 15% when referred to perceived health status and 16% referred to the absence of chronic 
health problems. 
Despite the corresponding results are not reported in the thesis, the same model was 
implemented using the dependent variable ‘index of mental health’ as a continuous variable. It 
was rescaled so that its minimum value was 0,76 and its maximum 6,94. The mental health 
coefficient so estimated is always negative and it measures -0,46. Also in this case, the 
coefficient is very high, since it indicates that migrants who were discriminated against report, 
on average, 0,46 points less in their mental health index, out of a maximum score of 6,94, with 
respect to not-discriminated-against ones. 
 It is interesting to notice that, while health conditions reported by the respondents refer 
to the present, questions about discrimination ask whether the migrants “has ever been 
discriminated against since her/his arrival in Italy”. Thus, discrimination episodes may have 
occurred even long time ago, but its consequences on health may still be there. Hence, it can be 
concluded that discrimination can have long term effects on migrants’ health status. 
The channels through which discrimination is associated with health are different. 
Firstly, feeling discriminated against induces negative psychological consequences, which turns 
to be negative for physical health too. Secondly, due to ‘taste’ discrimination by the hospital 
personnel, immigrants may be provided with lower healthcare and assistance. Moreover, 
discrimination can imply a lower socioeconomic position, thus limited access to higher quality 
hospitals and healthcare. 
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5.3 The association between health and employment status 
The aim of this paragraph is to analyse the association between health and labour market 
outcomes, in order to estimate the effects that health indirectly has on a relevant economic 
indicator, namely employment status. 
Firstly, the association between these two variables is estimated through a weighted least 
squares model. Though, the estimates obtained using this estimation strategy may be biased and 
inconsistent because of potential reverse causality and omitted variable bias, but it is interesting 
to start from this simple model to observe what are the associations between some controls of 
interest and the dependent variable, employment status. 
 The controls included in the following regression are sociodemographic, cultural, 
lingual features, information about smoking and drinking habits, residence information and a 
dummy indicating whether the respondent has ever worked in Italy. 
 The sample size is reduced because the dependent binary variable, employment status, 
only accounts for employed and unemployed people, thus excluding inactive respondents from 
the original sample. People active in the labour market are 10.895. ‘Employment status’ takes 
value one if the individual is employed and zero if she/he is unemployed and refers to the current 
employment status of migrants. 
What is to be primarily noticed observing Table 24 is the fact that all the three covariates 
measuring health are positively correlated with employment status. This is nothing surprising, 
because it is intuitive to think that healthier people are more likely to be employed. However, 
this estimate may be biased, because there may be some unobservable variables, that are not 
controlled for, which affect both health and employment status. For example, migrants living 
in wealthier areas can benefit from a more dynamic labour market, wider social networks and 
may also have easier access to better hospitals and healthcare services. Moreover, another 
source of bias may be reverse causality: employment status can affect health in the same way 
health affects employment status. In fact, employed people may report better mental health 
indices and better general health conditions due to lower levels of stress and frustration. 
Other interesting estimates concern gender and marital status: being a woman is negatively 
correlated with being employed, as well as being married makes it less likely to have an 
employment. It is known that for a native Italian woman employment chances are lower than 
for men, then it is not surprising that the same chances may be even lower for migrant women. 
As expected, migrants who master a fluent Italian are more likely to be employed than those 
who are not able to speak Italian. Contrary to expectations, instead, it emerges that education 
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level has no statistically significant correlation with employment status: having a higher 
education level does not affect the chances of being employed in a significant way.  
 
Table 24-Weighted Least Squares Regression of the Association between Health and Employment Status 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable 
Employment 
status 
Employment 
status 
Employment 
status 
        
Index of Mental Health 0.076***   
 (0.010)   
Perceived health Status  0.044***  
  (0.015)  
Absence of chronic health problems   0.030* 
   (0.015) 
Gender (1=female) -0.023** -0.024** -0.026** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Married -0.051*** -0.048*** -0.047*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Education level (base level: no education)    
Primary education 0.0048 0.0041 0.0066 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Secondary education 0.00090 -0.00094 -0.00022 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
High school education 0.0019 0.00048 0.0020 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Tertiary education 0.013 0.0096 0.013 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Ability to speak Italian (base level: not good at all)    
Not good 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
Quite good 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
Very Good 0.15** 0.17** 0.17** 
 (0.070) (0.071) (0.071) 
Continent of origin (base level: Europe)    
Africa -0.070*** -0.072*** -0.072*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Asia 0.0037 0.0061 0.0064 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
 North America 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) 
Central and South America -0.032* -0.032* -0.030 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Oceania 0.40*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.055)     
Observations 9,240 9,174 9,153 
R-squared 0.133 0.123 0.122 
The model is estimated through weighted least squares. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent 
is employed, to zero if she/he is unemployed. Inactive people are excluded from the sample. The covariates of interest are 
dummies too: they are equal to one if, respectively, the index of mental health is higher than the sample average, if the 
perceived health is very good or good and if the individual has no chronic health problems. Only part of the controls is 
displayed in the table. All the controls include: sociodemographic (gender, age, education level, BMI, length of stay in 
Italy), cultural (religion, Continent of origin), lingual (ability to speak, understand, read and write in Italian) features, 
information about residence (size of the municipality, macro-area (North, Centre, South and Isles), frequency of police 
controls and degree of police effectiveness) and dummies concerning the specific occupation, information about smoking 
and drinking habits. Robust standard errors are displayed in brackets (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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The second model which is implemented to analyse the association between health and 
employment status is a GMM model, which uses two instrumental variables as well: ‘verbal 
insults’ and ‘threats and assaults’.  The aim of this model is to tackle reverse causality and 
omitted variable bias and to get consistent estimates, as explained in the “Empirical strategy” 
section. The estimates obtained and presented in Table 25 constitute just a first step towards 
causality. 
The controls included in this model are the same used in the weighted least squares 
regression and the great number of missing values is justified by the same reasons.  
 Also this table reports the estimates both for a weighted model and for a model without 
weights. In this case, both first and second stage estimated coefficients are generally lower, in 
absolute value, for the no weights model, indicating that the correlation between discrimination 
and health, as well as between health and employment status, is lower for the Southern 
observations, which are oversampled.  
The first stage equation of this model is precisely the reduced form of the previous 
GMM model estimating the relationship between perceived discrimination and health. Indeed, 
this first stage equation estimates the direct relation between health and insults and assaults 
without “filtering” it through the level of perceived discrimination. As it emerges from Table 
21, the direct effect that discrimination has on health is always negative, though its modulus 
and its statistical significance are different for the three measures of health. Particularly, as it is 
expected, the impact of perceived discrimination is stronger when considering psychological 
health: an immigrant who has ever been threatened or aggressed is 11% less likely to have a 
good mental health index and the same percentage increases to 13% for migrants who have 
experienced verbal insults. Moreover, these estimates are statistically significant at a 1% 
significance level and the F-statistics measures 31, far above the threshold level of 10. Instead, 
the correlation between discrimination and health is understandably weaker when considering 
the absence of chronic health problems as a measure of health. In fact, the estimated coefficient 
for the instrument ‘threats and assaults’ is not even significant and instruments are quite weak, 
since the F-statistics has value 12,5, just above the conventional threshold. On the whole, it can 
be said that being aggressed or offended is harmful for migrants’ health. 
As to the second stage equation, which estimates the effect that exogenous variations of 
health due to insults and harassment have on employment, all the estimated coefficients indicate 
a positive contribution of health to employment. The coefficients that are obtained are even 
quite high: people with a better mental health index are 28% more likely to be employed, as 
well as people perceiving a better health are even 37% more likely to have a job. 
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Table 25-Instrumental Variable Regression of the Association between Health and Employment 
 WEIGHTED NOT WEIGHTED 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 First stage Second stage First stage Second stage 
Dependent variables (1) 
Index of Mental 
Health 
Employment 
status 
Index of Mental 
Health 
Employment 
status 
      
Verbal insults -0.13***   -0.10***  
 (0.023)   (0.017)  
Threats/assaults -0.11***   -0.11***  
 (0.034)   (0.025)  
Index of Mental Health  0.28**  0.19** 
  (0.13)  (0.089) 
      
Observations 9,240 9,240 9,240 9,240 
R-squared 0.078   0.064  
IV F-stat  31,00  46,67 
Hansen's test   1,00   1,00 
Dependent variables (2) 
Perceived 
Health Status 
Employment 
status 
Perceived 
Health Status 
Employment 
status 
      
Verbal insults -0.079***   -0.071***  
 (0.018)   (0.014)  
Threats/assaults -0.097***   -0.078***  
 (0.029)   (0.022)  
Perceived Health Status  0.37**  0.27* 
  (0.18)  (0.14) 
      
Observations 9,174 9,174 9,174 9,174 
R-squared 0.095   0.085  
IV F-stat  19,04  27,95 
Hansen's test   1,00   0,896 
Dependent variables (3) 
Absence of 
Chronic Health 
Problems 
Employment 
status 
Absence of 
Chronic Health 
Problems 
Employment 
status 
      
Verbal insults 0.075***   0.053***  
 (0.018)   (0.012)  
Threats/assaults 0.033   0.035*  
 (0.026)   (0.019)  
Absence of Chronic Health Problems  0.69*  0.50* 
  (0.39)  (0.28) 
      
Observations 9,153 9,153 9,153 9,153 
R-squared 0.084   0.068  
IV F-stat  12,05  15,3 
Hansen's test  1,00   1,00 
The model is estimated through the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). The dependent variable is a dummy equal 
to one if the respondent is employed, to zero if she/he is unemployed. Inactive people are excluded from the sample. 
Also the endogenous variables are equal to one if, respectively, the index of mental health is higher than the sample 
average, if the perceived health is very good or good and if the individual has no chronic health problems. The model is 
overidentified, since two instruments are used: they are two dummies, taking value one if the individual has ever been 
insulted or threatened. The controls included in the regression but not displayed in the table are: sociodemographic 
(gender, age, education level, BMI, length of stay in Italy), cultural (religion, Continent of origin) and lingual (ability to 
speak, understand, read and write in Italian) information, information about residence (size of the municipality, macro-
area (North, Centre, South and Isles), frequency of police controls and degree of police effectiveness, information about 
smoking and drinking habits. Robust standard errors are displayed in brackets (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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The magnitude of these coefficients seems to suggest that some controls are probably missing 
in the regression. Hence, what can be affirmed with certainty is that health is positively 
associated with employment status in a statistically significant way, but as to the quantitative 
aspect, future analyses should make it clearer. 
In other words, as it is intuitive to think, health is one of the inputs of human capital: 
bad health conditions, both psychological and physical, hinders the development of human 
capital and thus makes it more difficult to be employed. The indirect association between 
insults, harassment and employment status can be explained as follows: offences and threats, 
undermining psychological and physical health, lowers the human capital of those migrants 
who perceive they are discriminated against and thus reduces their chances of being employed. 
 
5.4 The association between perceived discrimination and social integration 
The last model that is going to be presented in this thesis aims at analysing what kind of 
correlation exists between discrimination and integration. It is important to highlight that the 
kind of integration that is considered is the so-called ‘social integration’, to be distinguished 
from structural integration. The latter refers, for example, to the educational attainments and to 
the immigrants’ position in the labour market. Instead, socio-cultural integration is “the social 
contacts that ethnic minorities have with individuals and agencies of the majority group” (K. 
Vancluysen and M. Van Craen, 2010). Some indicators of this kind of integration are 
immigrants’ values, norms, opinions and proficiency of the majority language. Social 
integration can be said to be a much more subjective integration measure and, once more, this 
is in line with the spirit of this work, which uses data describing migrants’ subjective 
perceptions. 
 It is interesting to investigate the correlation between discrimination and integration 
because in the literature different studies have pointed out different correlations. According to 
the assimilation theory (Gordon, 1964) the more an individual is integrated in the host society 
and the less she/he is discriminated, whereas according to the ethnic competition theory (Portes 
et al., 1980) the more integrated a migrant is and the more she/he will perceive discrimination. 
These theories basically state that discrimination and integration are to be considered jointly, 
because they are mutually determined. To say it in econometric terms, there exists reverse 
causality: discrimination contributes to determine integration as well as the integration process 
affects the probability of being discriminated against. 
 The association between discrimination and integration is first investigated through a 
weighted least squares model, whose estimates are illustrated in Table 26.  
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Table 26-Weighted Least Squares of the Association between Discrimination and Integration 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variables 
Interest in 
Italian 
politics 
Watching 
Italian TV 
news 
Television 
language 
Cinema at 
least once a 
year 
          
Perceived discrimination 0.075*** 0.0065 -0.022* -0.0057 
 (0.013) (0.0092) (0.012) (0.013) 
Gender (1=female) -0.13*** -0.0060 0.065*** 0.017 
 (0.013) (0.0099) (0.012) (0.012) 
Married 0.013 -0.0077 -0.085*** -0.057*** 
 (0.012) (0.0089) (0.011) (0.012) 
Education level (base level: no education)     
Primary education -0.0087 -0.034 -0.024 -0.073*** 
 (0.034) (0.028) (0.032) (0.024) 
Secondary education 0.026 0.0049 0.033 -0.033 
 (0.025) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) 
High school education 0.078*** 0.0051 0.019 0.028 
 (0.025) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) 
Tertiary education 0.17*** 0.022 -0.032 0.13*** 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.027) (0.025) 
Ability to speak Italian (base level: not good at all)     
Not good -0.061 0.076 -0.0066 0.081* 
 (0.065) (0.076) (0.073) (0.047) 
Quite good 0.013 0.23*** 0.097 0.13** 
 (0.070) (0.075) (0.074) (0.054) 
Very Good 0.0044 0.24*** 0.092 0.096 
 (0.073) (0.075) (0.076) (0.059) 
Ability to understand Italian (base level: not good at all)     
Not good 0.098 0.023 0.040 -0.060 
 (0.065) (0.076) (0.073) (0.050) 
Quite good 0.081 0.0053 0.055 -0.11* 
 (0.070) (0.076) (0.075) (0.057) 
Very Good 0.14* 0.041 0.10 -0.036 
 (0.073) (0.076) (0.076) (0.061) 
     
Observations 12,106 11,368 11,368 12,106 
R-squared 0.155 0.171 0.160 0.170 
The model is estimated through weighted least squares. The dependent variables are binary: they are equal to one if , 
respectively, migrants are interested in Italian politics, are used to watching Italian TV news, to watch Italian TV channels 
and, finally, if they go to the theatre at least once a year. Also the covariate of interest is binary: it takes value one if  the 
respondent has ever felt discriminated against in various contexts (hospitals, public offices, workplace). Only part of the 
controls is displayed in the table. All the controls used are: sociodemographic (gender, age, education level, BMI, length of 
stay in Italy), cultural (religion, Continent of origin), lingual (ability to speak, understand, read and write in Italian) features, 
information about residence (size of the municipality, macro-area (North, Centre, South and Isles), frequency of police 
controls and degree of police effectiveness). Robust standard errors are displayed in brackets (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1). 
 
Despite the coefficients so estimated may be biased and inconsistent because of the reverse 
causality bias explained above, this first model gives a hint of what are the associations between 
the variables. In both these models the number of observations does not coincide with the 
overall sample, because some people refused to answer to questions related to integration and 
discrimination. More numeric details are provided in Table 8, in Section 3. 
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 As far as the dependent variables are concerned, four different variables are used as 
integration measures: migrants’ interest in Italian politics, their habit to watch Italian TV news, 
to watch Italian TV channels and, finally, whether they go to the theatre at least once a year. 
All these variables are dummies. The first one takes value one if migrants are interested in 
Italian politics and zero otherwise, as well as ‘Italian TV news’ and ‘television language’ have 
value one if the respondent does watch it and zero if she/he does not. Also ‘cinema at least once 
a year’ is a dummy equal to one if the respondent usually goes to the cinema at least once a 
year and to zero otherwise.  
It is important to notice that the indicators of integration chosen concern what I would 
define “unobservable integration”. In fact, the dependent variables just described identify 
migrants’ private behaviours, that is those attitudes that migrants usually take on in their 
everyday life, which indicate what is their real level of cultural assimilation and not the effort 
they make to be socially accepted. 
 The explanatory variable of interest, discrimination, is a binary variable constructed as 
in the previous models. 
 The controls included in the following regression are sociodemographic, cultural, 
lingual features and residence information. Employment information is not included among the 
controls because it would be a bad control, since migrants’ employment status can have been 
determined after they were discriminated against, hence this variable itself may be considered 
an outcome variable in the regression at hand. If ‘employments status’ was used as a control, 
the estimated coefficients would be biased, because migrants discriminated against may have 
lower probability to be integrated even if employed and in the absence of discrimination, due 
to, for example, some personal characteristics that are unobservable. 
Table 25 illustrates the coefficients estimated through the weighted least squares model. What 
emerges looking at the correlations between the controls and the dependent variables is that the 
signs of the controls’ coefficients are very different in the four regressions. It is interesting to 
notice that people with higher education levels are more likely to be interested in Italian politics 
or to go to the cinema once a year, but there is no significant correlation with watching Italian 
television for the more educated migrants with respect to the not educated ones. It is surprising 
to observe that understanding Italian language makes no difference in terms of socio-cultural 
integration relative to not understanding Italian at all, except for interest in Italian politics, 
whose coefficient is weakly significant. As far as the explanatory variable of interest is 
concerned, discrimination, results are mixed. In fact, its estimated parameter is negative and 
statistically significant in column 3, positive and significant in column 1, not significant in 
column 2 and 4. Hence, looking at these results, it is unclear what is the association between 
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discrimination and integration. These mixed findings may be due to reverse causality between 
the two variables, so the following model estimates the same association through an 
instrumental variable regression. 
 The instrumental variable estimator which is used is the GMM. The instruments selected 
are the same used in the previous model. Estimates are reported in Table 27. 
 The first stage equation of this model is exactly the same as in the first model, the one 
estimating the association between discrimination and health, thus coefficients are positive, 
highly statistically significant and the value of the F-statistics is above the conventional 
threshold of 10. 
 As to the second stage weighted estimates, they are very different from one another. 
Particularly, none of them is significant except for the one in the first panel regression, whose 
dependent variable is ‘interest in Italian politics’. The coefficient relative to this first regression 
is positive, thus indicating that those migrants who have ever been discriminated against are 
also the ones who are more interested in Italian politics: they are even 27% more likely, with 
respect to not-discriminated-against migrants, to care about Italian politics. This association 
could be interpreted as follows: migrants who perceive they are discriminated against make 
more effort in assimilating the Italian culture, thus they show a higher interest in Italian politics 
with the aim of being socially accepted. 
As to the estimates in the subsequent panels, they are not significant and they have opposite 
signs. Also the estimates obtained through the model without weights are not always significant, 
but they all share the same positive sign. This signals that migrants discriminated against who 
live in the South are those migrants who have a higher level of social integration. 
All things considered, in estimating these models ISTAT data does not point out any 
significant association that can be clearly interpreted. Such mixed results do not allow to draw 
any conclusion, nor in favour of the assimilation theory, neither of the ethnic competition 
theory. 
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Table 27-Instrumental Variable Regression of the Association between Discrimination and Social Integration 
  WEIGHTED NOT WEIGHTED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 First stage Second stage First stage Second stage 
Dependent variable (1) 
Perceived 
discrimination 
Interest in 
Italian politics 
Perceived 
discrimination 
Interest in 
Italian politics 
 
     
Verbal insults 0.47***   0.49***  
 (0.018)   (0.013)  
Threats/assaults 0.18***   0.18***  
 (0.027)   (0.021)  
Perceived discrimination  0.27***  0.27*** 
  (0.052)  (0.039) 
 
     
Observations 12,106 12,106 12,106 12,106 
R-squared 0.197   0.204  
IV F-stat  541,396  1039,69 
Hansen's J test (p-value)  0,9845  1,00 
Dependent variable (2) 
Perceived 
discrimination 
Italian TV news 
Perceived 
discrimination 
Italian TV 
news 
 
     
Verbal insults 0.47***   0.49***  
 (0.019)   (0.013)  
Threats/assaults 0.17***   0.17***  
 (0.029)   (0.022)  
Perceived discrimination  0.038  0.060** 
  (0.037)  (0.024) 
 
     
Observations 11,368 11,368 11,368 11,368 
R-squared 0.194 0.168 0.202 0.050 
IV F-stat  489,433  956,005 
Hansen's J test (p-value)  1,00  0,853 
Dependent variable (3) 
Perceived 
discrimination 
Italian TV 
channels 
Perceived 
discrimination 
Italian TV 
channels 
 
     
Verbal insults 0.47***   0.49***  
 (0.019)   (0.013)  
Threats/assaults 0.17***   0.17***  
 (0.029)   (0.022)  
Perceived discrimination  -0.052  0.0055 
  (0.047)  (0.034) 
 
     
Observations 11,368 11,368 11,368 11,368 
R-squared 0.194   0.202 0.081 
IV F-stat  489,433  956,005 
Hansen's J test (p-value)  0,9879  1,00 
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Dependent variable (4) 
Perceived 
discrimination 
Cinema at least 
once a year 
Perceived 
discrimination 
Cinema at 
least once a 
year 
 
     
Verbal insults 0.47***   0.49***  
 (0.018)   (0.013)  
Threats/assaults 0.18***   0.18***  
 (0.027)   (0.021)  
Perceived discrimination  -0.012  0.016 
  (0.055)  (0.036) 
      
Observations 12,106 12,106 12,106 12,106 
R-squared 0.197 0.166 0.204 0.133 
IV F-stat  541,396  1039,69 
Hansen's J test (p-value)   1,00   1,00 
The model is estimated through the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). The dependent variables are 
binary: they are equal to one if, respectively, migrants are interested in Italian politics, are used to watching 
Italian TV news, to watch Italian TV channels and, finally, if they go to the theatre at least once a year. Also 
the endogenous variable is binary, it takes value one if the respondent has ever felt discriminated against in 
various contexts (hospitals, public offices, workplace). The instruments are dummies too, taking value one if 
the individual has ever been insulted or threatened. The controls included in the regression but not displayed 
in the table are: sociodemographic (gender, age, education level, BMI, length of stay in Italy), cultural 
(religion, Continent of origin), lingual (ability to speak, understand, read and write in Italian) information, 
information about residence (size of the municipality, macro-area (North, Centre, South and Isles), frequency 
of police controls and degree of police effectiveness), information about smoking and drinking habits. Robust 
standard errors are displayed in brackets (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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6. Conclusion 
 
In the previous paragraphs it was investigated whether discrimination against immigrants has 
any correlation with some social and economic outcomes. The dimensions which are put in 
relation with discrimination are socio-cultural integration, health and employment status. 
 As to the first aspect, integration, modelling ISTAT data does not allow to draw any 
specific conclusion about the correlation between integration and discrimination, because the 
obtained estimates are not statistically significant and their signs are different. Hence, it cannot 
be said whether discrimination against immigrants slows down their integration process, or, as 
the ethnic competition theory would suggest, it works as a sort of stimulus, pushing migrants 
to assimilate Italian culture. This finding is not surprising if compared with previous studies: 
many of them reach opposite conclusions and others (see Vancluysen, K., Van Craen, M., 2010) 
came to mixed results, not univocally interpretable. 
 As far as the second dimension considered is concerned, health outcomes, it emerged 
that discrimination is negatively associated not only with mental health, as it was predictable, 
but also, even if in a weaker fashion, with physical health. This correlation is interesting, 
because it provides an alternative explanation to the fact that migrants’ health status is usually 
worse than natives’ one, which is usually ascribed to lower socioeconomic status. The present 
findings hint at the possibility that discrimination can be an alternative factor to explain 
migrants’ worse health conditions. The channels through which discrimination can affect 
migrants’ health are mainly two of them. First, the perception of being discriminated against 
certainly generates high levels of stress and frustration which could result in a poorer 
psychological and physical health. Secondly, if health professionals have a ‘taste’ for 
discrimination, then migrants are likely to be provided with lower health care standards. These 
findings are consistent with the ones by Johnston D.W. and Lordan G. (2011), who suggest 
which are the channels linking discrimination to worse health status. 
 The third aspect analysed in this thesis is the association between health and immigrants’ 
employment status. Findings tell that people in a better health status are much more likely to be 
employed than sick ones. This is nothing new nor surprising, though if this result is put in 
relation with the previous findings, it can be seen that, since discrimination is negatively 
correlated with health, which is positively associated with employment status, then 
discrimination hinders migrants’ chances to get employed. Also in this case there can be a 
double explanation to this correlation. First, discrimination, undermining psychological and 
physical health, lowers the human capital of those migrants who perceive they are discriminated 
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against and thus reduces their chances of being employed. Secondly, another channel through 
which discrimination can affect employment opportunities is employers’ ‘taste’ for 
discrimination: employers may carry out discriminatory hiring practice, thus preferring to hire 
only native workers (Becker, 1957). 
 All the results that have just been summarised represent a first exploration of causal 
relationships between the variables. Indeed, despite every association is estimated using an 
instrumental variable strategy to overcome reverse causality and omitted variable bias, the 
assumption that the selected instruments are perfectly exogenous and uncorrelated with the 
structural equation error term may be criticized. It is hoped that this work can be considered a 
point of departure for deeper analyses aiming at identifying causal relationships. 
 Nevertheless, this thesis is characterised by some original elements. First of all, it is one 
of the few studies which conduct econometric analyses exploiting data about Italian 
immigrants. Secondly, and more important, the data used is drawn from the survey “Condizione 
e Integrazione Sociale dei Cittadini Stranieri” (2011), which collects very recent data. In fact, 
the survey was carries out in 2011 and the dataset was published only on October 2016. 
Therefore, this is one of the first studies, if not the very first one, manipulating this data. 
 In conclusion, it is hoped that this work will inspire future studies about Italian 
immigrants, able to point out causal relationships of social and economic interest. 
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